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The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages 
abstract.  In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution 
does not permit the imposition of punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm caused to 
third parties. This Article critiques the reasoning, but seeks ultimately to vindicate the result, of 
that landmark decision. It argues that, although the Court’s procedural due process analysis does 
not stand up to scrutiny, punitive damages as punishment for third-party harm do indeed violate 
procedural due process, but for reasons far more profound than those offered by the Court. To 
reach that conclusion, the Article confronts the most basic and fundamental questions about 
punitive damages—questions that the Supreme Court has studiously avoided for more than a 
century: what, exactly, is the purpose of punitive damages, and how is it constitutional to 
impose them as a form of punishment in a judicial proceeding without affording the defendant 
the protection of the Constitution’s criminal procedural safeguards? The Article argues that 
punitive damages are properly conceptualized as a form of punishment for private wrongs: 
judicially sanctioned private revenge. As such, it makes both theoretical and doctrinal sense to 
impose them without affording the defendant criminal procedural protections, which are 
necessitated only for the punishment of public wrongs on behalf of society. When, however, 
courts employ punitive damages as a form of punishment for public wrongs, they become a 
substitute for the criminal law, which thus makes an intolerable end run around the Bill of 
Rights. For that reason, Williams was ultimately correct that punitive damages must be limited 
to punishment for the harm done to the individual plaintiff, not the harm done to the general 
public. This reasoning suggests that contrary to the emerging conventional wisdom, Williams 
does not stand in the way of the imposition of nonpunitive extracompensatory damages of the 
type favored by law and economics scholars as a means of forcing the defendant to internalize the 
costs of its behavior in order to achieve optimal deterrence. 
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introduction 
 Recently, in Philip Morris USA v. Williams,1 the Supreme Court held that 
“the Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive 
damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon 
nonparties.”2 Williams is a revolutionary holding, and it was all but 
unthinkable just a few years ago, when American courts—with the apparent 
blessing of the Supreme Court—routinely awarded punitive damages to punish 
the defendant for the harm that it caused to all of society, not just the harm 
that it visited upon the individual plaintiff before the court. Indeed, it was that 
phenomenon that was largely responsible for most of the headline-grabbing, 
astronomical punitive damages awards of the past several decades. 
Yet, for a path-breaking, five-to-four decision on a major constitutional 
question, the Williams opinion is strangely terse and unreasoned. This Article 
seeks to answer many of the questions raised by the Court’s cryptic and at 
times misguided analysis, and to provide the theoretical defense of the Court’s 
holding that is missing from its own opinion. 
Part I explains how the Williams holding shattered the modern consensus 
that punitive damages can and should be imposed to punish the defendant for 
the full scope of the harm that it visited upon society. The Court reasoned that 
it violates due process to punish a defendant for harming a large number of 
people without demanding evidence relating to the particularities of each of 
those injuries and without affording the defendant the opportunity to raise 
individualized defenses. Part II exposes the Court’s reasoning as internally 
inconsistent and insufficient to justify the result in the case. 
Parts III and IV then seek to salvage Williams by explaining that punishing 
the defendant for harm to nonparties does indeed violate the defendant’s 
procedural due process rights, but for reasons much more profound than those 
offered by the Court. That task necessitates paring the punitive damages 
doctrine down to the conceptual bone. In two centuries of issuing punitive 
damages decisions, the Supreme Court has never adequately answered the 
most simple and fundamental of questions: What, exactly, are punitive 
damages? What is their purpose? The Court has evaded those questions with 
superficial platitudes that ultimately do nothing more than raise a different but 
no less monumental question. 
 
1.  127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
2.  Id. at 1063. 
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The purpose of punitive damages, the Supreme Court has repeatedly told 
us, is to punish and deter, like the criminal law.3 But if that is so, then a deeper 
fundamental question looms: why are they constitutional? The Constitution 
makes clear that those who face criminal punishment are entitled to an array of 
procedural safeguards, including the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt,4 the privilege against self-incrimination,5 and the right to be free from 
double jeopardy,6 among others. The obvious objection to punitive damages is 
that it seems clearly unconstitutional to punish a defendant with a sanction 
that the Supreme Court concedes is conceptually and functionally 
indistinguishable from a criminal punishment without affording the 
procedural safeguards that the Constitution guarantees to criminal defendants. 
That objection has plagued punitive damages for well over a century. Yet the 
Supreme Court has never confronted it.7 Instead, the Court has consistently 
sidestepped the issue with the assurance that punitive damages must be 
constitutional because they predate the Constitution and the Framers 
manifested no intention to displace them. 
Part III explains that this evasion will not do, for it is based on a profound 
misunderstanding of the historical purpose and function of punitive damages. 
Historically, punitive damages were generally treated as punishment for 
private wrongs to individuals, not public wrongs to society. History thus 
provides no safe harbor for modern awards of punitive damages designed to 
mimic the criminal law by punishing the defendant for the full scope of the 
harm that it inflicted upon society. 
As such, what the Williams Court failed to recognize is that the 
constitutionality of awarding punitive damages for harm to nonparties cannot 
be resolved without confronting the fundamental question head on: how is it 
that punitive damages are constitutional? Part IV does just that. It concludes 
that the Constitution necessitates criminal procedural safeguards only when a 
sanction seeks to punish the defendant for a public wrong. Thus, punitive 
damages are constitutional if they fulfill their historical role of punishing the 
 
3.  See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003); BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
4.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
5.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself . . . .”). 
6.  See id. (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb . . . .”). 
7.  See Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 131 (2005) 
(noting the Court’s longstanding “disinclination to engage the civil-criminal gestalt in 
dealing with the applicability of constitutional criminal provisions” to punitive damages). 
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defendant for the private wrong committed upon the individual plaintiff, but 
they are unconstitutional in their (pre-Williams) recent incarnation as 
punishment for the public wrong visited on society. In reaching this 
conclusion, Part IV seeks to provide a sophisticated theoretical and 
constitutional account of punitive damages as both sensible and permissible 
punishment for the harm to the plaintiff, but not as punishment for the harm 
to others. It argues that punitive damages are a form of legalized private 
revenge—both theoretically and constitutionally distinct from the public 
retribution and deterrence achieved through the criminal law. That is the true 
justification for the result in Williams: punishing the defendant for the harm to 
nonparties converts punitive damages into a criminal remedy, which the 
Constitution will not tolerate in a civil proceeding. 
Part V looks ahead. Despite some loose language that others have 
interpreted as a debilitating loophole, Williams will, I assert, have a significant 
effect on reducing massive punitive damages awards. There is a risk that its 
impact will go too far, however, and result in the underdeterrence of harmful 
behavior. Part V addresses the states’ ability to respond to that concern. Others 
have suggested that Williams essentially constitutionalizes one of the many 
rationales for punitive damages and forecloses the states from using punitive 
damages to achieve ends other than private punishment—such as ensuring 
efficient deterrence. In essence, they claim, Williams effectively serves as a 
federal license for companies to misbehave, cause diffuse harm, and profit from 
it.8 Part V rejects that claim by arguing that Williams does not constitutionalize 
one particular vision or theory of punitive damages (punishment for private 
wrongs) to the exclusion of all others; it simply provides that the Constitution 
precludes one (and only one) particular vision or theory of punitive damages 
(punishment for public wrongs—the prevailing modern theory). Williams thus 
allows the states to address the underdeterrence concern by implementing the 
recommendation of law and economics scholars to create a category of 
extracompensatory damages designed to ensure optimal deterrence. Such 
damages would not be a form of punishment, and thus—even though they 
would seek to serve a purely public interest—they would not constitute 
unconstitutional punishment for public wrongs. Once we take the punishment 
out of punitive damages, as law and economics scholars have been urging us to 
do for decades, we avoid the constitutional infirmity involved in Williams. 
 
8.  See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Uncert-worthiness of the Court’s Unmaking of Punitive 
Damages, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 459, 494 (2008). 
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i .  the end of total harm punitive damages 
In the decades leading up to Williams, punitive damages were, with 
increasing frequency, awarded to punish the defendant for the total harm that 
its wrongful conduct caused to all of society, not just the harm that it caused to 
the actual plaintiff or plaintiffs before the court9—a sweeping sanction that I 
and others have referred to as “total harm” punitive damages.10 It was this 
phenomenon that was largely responsible for most of the jaw-dropping 
punitive damage awards in recent years. A jury that sees its mission as 
inflicting an appropriate punishment for causing thousands, or even millions, 
of injuries or deaths is likely to award punitive damages in an amount several 
orders of magnitude greater than it would award if it understood its task much 
more modestly as punishing the defendant for the wrong done only to the 
single victim before the court. To take a particularly striking example, in 2002, 
a California jury awarded a single smoker who contracted lung cancer 
$850,000 in compensatory damages and $28 billion—billion!—in punitive 
damages.11 That staggering punitive award was surely beyond the pale as 
punishment for causing only the plaintiff’s illness and suffering; no rational 
justice system could possibly mete out that kind of penalty for harming a single 
person, no matter how severe the suffering and how reprehensible the 
wrongdoing. But it was not necessarily unreasonable as punishment for the 
harm done to the literally millions of smokers who were injured or killed by the 
defendant’s fraud (if one concludes, as did the jury, that the tobacco company 
was guilty of maliciousness in knowingly causing those countless deaths and 
injuries). Plaintiff’s counsel drove home this very point in closing argument:  
 
Less than 3,000 people died in the Twin Towers terrorist attack. 
When I say ‘less than,’ that sounds really weird because what an 
unbelievable human toll; but in the terms we are talking about here, 
just so we can bring this down, that’s a 30-day toll in California alone 
right now from smoking cigarettes.12  
 
9.  See Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as 
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 584-85 (2003); Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 349-51 (2003). 
10.  See, e.g., Colby, supra note 9, at 587; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-Than-
Whole Damages in Personal Injury Law: Deterrence and Punishment, 71 TENN. L. REV. 117, 127 
(2003); Rachel M. Janutis, Reforming Reprehensibility: The Continued Viability of Multiple 
Punitive Damages After State Farm v. Campbell, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1465, 1466 n.2 (2004). 
11.  See Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140, 151 (Ct. App. 2006). 
12.  Id. at 163 n.19. 
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Awards of total harm punitive damages, including many in the multi-
millions of dollars, were commonplace in the years leading up to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Williams.13 The Williams case itself is typical of the 
phenomenon. Plaintiff Mayola Williams sued Philip Morris for causing the 
death of her husband, who died of lung cancer after many years of smoking 
Philip Morris cigarettes. In closing arguments, Williams’s lawyer urged the 
jury to punish Philip Morris not only for the harm caused to her husband, but 
also for the harm visited upon all of the thousands of other smokers in the state 
who had been injured by smoking Philip Morris cigarettes.14 The jury 
apparently complied, awarding Williams $79.5 million in punitive damages. 
The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the jury’s award because Philip Morris’s 
conduct “caused a significant number of deaths each year in Oregon”15 and, it 
concluded, there is nothing unconstitutional about “using punitive damages to 
punish a defendant for harm to nonparties.”16 
A decade ago, the Supreme Court of the United States seemingly agreed 
with that proposition. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court held 
that federalism concerns preclude a state court from using punitive damages to 
punish a defendant for harm caused to out-of-state victims, at least where the 
defendant’s conduct was legal in the other state,17 but the Court clearly, albeit 
implicitly, endorsed the notion that there is nothing wrong with allowing the 
jury to punish the defendant for the harm caused to all in-state victims, even 
those not before the court.18 That suggestion accorded with a consensus among 
courts and commentators that punitive damages are intended to serve as 
punishment for public wrongs—wrongs to society—and therefore should be 
 
13.  See Sharkey, supra note 9, at 350-51. 
14.  See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (2007); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 2, Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256). 
15.  Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1170, 1175 (Or. 2006) (quoting Williams v. 
Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 839 (Or. 2002)). 
16.  Id. at 1175. 
17.  517 U.S. 559, 570-74 (1996). The Court subsequently extended that holding to preclude a 
state from punishing a defendant even for unlawful out-of-state conduct. See State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003). 
18.  See BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 & n.35 (evaluating whether the punitive damages award was 
excessive as punishment for the harm done to all of the in-state victims, rather than the 
harm done to the plaintiff alone); see also Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive 
Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 25 n.112 (2004); Colby, supra note 
9, at 603-04 & n.66. 
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calibrated by reference to the full scope of harm that the defendant’s conduct 
visited upon all of society.19 
I took issue with that consensus in a 2003 article that concluded, based on 
an analysis of the origins and early evolution of punitive damages, that punitive 
damages historically were understood to serve as punishment for private 
wrongs to individuals, rather than as punishment for public wrongs to 
society.20 Given that history, I argued that, “to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, all punitive damages awards must be designed (and limited to the 
amount necessary) to punish the defendant only for the wrong done, and the 
harm caused, to the individual plaintiff or plaintiffs before the court.”21 
Shortly after the publication of that article, the Supreme Court issued a 
cryptic opinion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, in 
which it remarked that a “defendant should be punished for the conduct that 
harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business. Due 
process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to 
adjudicate the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims against a 
defendant.”22 Several courts and commentators interpreted Campbell as 
reversing course 180 degrees and precluding punishment for harm to 
nonparties.23 Drawing upon other seemingly contradictory passages in the 
 
19.  See Colby, supra note 9, at 586, 603-06 (describing this consensus, which emerged without 
reason or explanation over the last several decades). 
20.  See id. at 613-43. 
21.  Id. at 591. 
22.  Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423; see also id. (“Nor does our review of the Utah courts’ decisions 
convince us that State Farm was only punished for its actions toward the Campbells.”). 
23.  See, e.g., Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2004); Guido 
Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts—The Case of Punitive Damages, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 
333, 345-46 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005); Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1099 (2005) (observing that the Court “effectively recognized that 
punitive damages must punish private wrongs . . . and not the public wrong”); Zipursky, 
supra note 7, at 144 n.209. The California Court of Appeal, for instance, took the position 
that “Campbell . . . essentially adopted the narrow view of punitive damages Professor Colby 
had articulated in his law review article appearing in print shortly before the Supreme Court 
decided Campbell.” Allen, supra note 18, at 25-26 n.112 (discussing Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 
6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Ct. App. 2003)); see Romo, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 801 (“State Farm, in our 
view, impliedly disapproved this broad view of the goal and measure of punitive damages. 
Instead, as a matter of due process under the federal Constitution, the court adopted the 
more limited, historically based view of punitive damages.” (citing Colby, supra note 9, at 
667-73)); see also Galligan, supra note 10, at 126 & n.53. In Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 113 P.3d 
82 (Cal. 2005), the California Supreme Court partially rejected the California Court of 
Appeal’s conclusion. See id. at 92 (“The Romo court’s analysis does not convince us that the 
United States Supreme Court, in State Farm, adopted wholesale the ‘historical’ view of 
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Campbell opinion, however, other commentators interpreted the case much 
more narrowly—as breaking no new ground and in no way precluding 
punishment for harm to nonparties.24 Due to the inscrutability of the Campbell 
decision, the constitutionality of total harm punitive damages had been called 
into question but remained uncertain. 
Williams put an end to the uncertainty. The Court declared that, although 
it had not squarely decided either in favor of the constitutionality of total harm 
punitive damages in BMW, or against their constitutionality in Campbell, it 
was now prepared to resolve the issue: “We did not previously hold explicitly 
that a jury may not punish for the harm caused others. But we do so hold 
now.”25 
i i .  procedure,  substance,  and the inadequacy of williams 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,26 like its 
counterpart in the Fifth Amendment,27 protects two distinct categories of 
rights, generally referred to as rights of “procedural” and “substantive” due 
process.28 The Clause is most naturally read to “requir[e] the government to 
follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to ‘deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property.’”29 This is the concept of procedural due process, 
which is typically concerned with giving fair notice and a fair hearing before 
the government deprives individuals of their liberty or property.30 But the 
Clause has long been interpreted to extend further to “bar[] certain 
 
punitive damages outlined in the Colby article as a constitutional rule binding on the 
states.” (citation omitted)). 
24.  Some commentators interpreted Campbell as forbidding only punishment for dissimilar acts 
that harmed third parties. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Ned Miltenberg, The Need To 
Clarify the Meaning of U.S. Supreme Court Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages’ Cases, 
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 521-22 (2004). Other commentators interpreted Campbell as forbidding 
only punishment for out-of-state harm. See, e.g., Semra Mesulam, Note, Collective Rewards 
and Limited Punishment: Solving the Punitive Damages Dilemma with Class, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1114, 1128 (2004). 
25.  Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007). 
26.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
27.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”). 
28.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 545 (3d ed. 
2006). 
29.  Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). 
30.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 545. 
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government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to 
implement them.”31 This is the concept of substantive due process, which is 
concerned with preventing governmental oppression32 and with protecting 
fundamental rights from governmental interference.33 
 
A. Was the Williams Court’s Purported Reliance on Procedural Due Process 
Just a Ruse? 
In Williams, the Court purported to ground its holding in the doctrine of 
procedural due process, rather than its much-maligned substantive cousin.34 
The Court’s motivation for doing so is easy to explain: as it has reiterated 
many times, “the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of 
substantive due process.”35 Substantive due process, with its nominally 
oxymoronic nature and its dubious history of judicial overreaching, is the black 
sheep of constitutional rights. It operates in the murky shadows of Lochner v. 
New York,36 the poster child for the evils of “judicial activism.” Partially 
ashamed of the substantive due process doctrine’s very existence, the Court 
often struggles mightily to keep it confined to those shadows, out of the light 
of public and academic scrutiny. The United States Reports are full of landmark 
cases in which the Supreme Court, seeking to deflect comparisons to Lochner, 
has gone to drastic—sometimes ludicrous—lengths to avoid explicit reliance on 
substantive due process.37 As David Bernstein explains, “The ghost of Lochner 
 
31.  Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331. 
32.  See id. 
33.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992). While the notion of 
“substantive due process” might sound linguistically awkward to contemporary ears, it in 
fact has a very long historical pedigree in our law. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and 
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. 
L. REV. 1221, 1297 n.247 (1995). 
34.  See 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2004) (“[W]e need now only consider the Constitution’s 
procedural limitations.”). 
35.  Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). 
36.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
37.  See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 
GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005) (discussing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)); Tamar Ezer, A 
Positive Right to Protection for Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 22 (2004) (discussing 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)); Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due 
Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 739 (2002) (discussing the Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence); David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After 
Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125 (2001) (discussing the Court’s family privacy 
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v. New York haunts American constitutional law. . . . Supreme Court Justices 
are at pains to deny that their opinions declaring laws unconstitutional are 
Lochnerian, while dissenting Justices use Lochner as an epithet to criticize their 
colleagues.”38 And when it comes to cases involving economic rights—such as, 
arguably, the right to be free from excessive punitive damages—the analogy to 
Lochner is disturbingly acute. Whenever the Court invokes the substantive due 
process doctrine to limit punitive damages, impassioned cries of Lochnerism 
inevitably follow.39 
As such, the Court has always felt more comfortable imposing procedural 
due process limits on punitive damages than substantive ones. The Court has 
held, for instance, that procedural due process affords the defendant the right 
to judicial review of the size of the punitive damage award,40 and the right to 
de novo appellate review of the trial court’s determination that the award was 
not excessive.41 In so holding, the Court has “strongly emphasized the 
importance of the procedural component of the Due Process Clause” in the 
realm of punitive damages.42 
Some of the Court’s punitive damages decisions, however, have gone 
beyond the realm of fair process to impose substantive constitutional limits on 
the size of punitive damages awards. And yet, so afraid is the Court of the 
ghost of Lochner that it has attempted to mask those substantive decisions in 
procedural garb. 
Prior to its 1996 decision in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court 
had implied the existence of due process limits on the size of punitive damages 
awards, and it had explicitly suggested in dicta that those limits were grounded 
in substantive due process,43 but it had never actually struck down an award of 
 
opinions); Kathleen M. Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: The Elysian Fields of the Law, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 695, 706-07 (2004) (discussing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)); 
Richard G. Wilkins, The Structural Role of the Bill of Rights, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 525, 546-47 
(1992) (discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 
38.  David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2003). 
39.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the Rehnquist 
Court, 93 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1052-53 (2005) (book review). 
40.  Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994). 
41.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
42.  Oberg, 512 U.S. at 420; see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 9 (1991) 
(declaring that “‘it is not disputed that a jury award [of punitive damages] may not be 
upheld if . . . it was reached in proceedings lacking the elements of fundamental 
fairness’”(quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 
276 (1989))). 
43.  See Oberg, 512 U.S. at 420; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 
(1993). 
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punitive damages on those grounds. When, in BMW, the Court finally did 
strike down a punitive award as unconstitutionally excessive, it suddenly 
became cagey about just which component of the Due Process Clause formed 
the basis for its holding. The majority opinion never invoked the phrase 
“substantive due process”; it simply found a “due process” violation.44 Indeed, 
the majority opinion eschewed the word “substantive” altogether.45 Instead, in 
declaring the award unconstitutionally excessive, the Court emphasized that 
“[e]lementary notions of fairness . . . dictate that a person receive fair notice . . . 
of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose,” and ultimately held 
that, because “BMW did not receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the 
sanction that Alabama might impose,” the punitive damages award was 
“grossly excessive.”46 The requirement of adequate notice is, of course, 
traditionally associated with procedural due process, not substantive due 
process.47 
This nominal reliance in BMW on procedural concepts was, however, 
illusory. Nearly the entirety of the Court’s analysis was concerned with 
whether the award was “grossly excessive in relation to” the “State’s legitimate 
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition”48—a 
quintessentially substantive inquiry.49 If the state had previously enacted a law 
publicly declaring that any company that commits a tort like the one 
committed by BMW can be punished by punitive damages in an amount up to 
$1 billion—thus taking the issue of inadequate notice off the table—it is hard to 
believe that the Court’s decision would have come out any differently. The 
Court’s real problem with the punitive damages award in BMW was that it was 
 
44.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562-63, 568 (1996); see Michael J. Phillips, The 
Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 453, 471 n.110 (1998). 
45.  See Jeffrey R. White, State Farm and Punitive Damages: Call the Jury Back, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 
79, 93 n.96 (2005). 
46.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75. 
47.  See TXO, 509 U.S. at 462-63 (noting that an argument that the defendant “had no advance 
notice that the jury might be allowed to return such a large award” of punitive damages is an 
argument “that the punitive damages award is the result of a fundamentally unfair 
procedure”); Paul M. Sykes, Marking a Road to Nowhere? Supreme Court Sets Punitive 
Damages Guideposts in BMW v. Gore, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1084, 1113 (1997). 
48.  517 U.S. at 568 (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 456). 
49.  See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-34 (2001) (citing 
BMW for the proposition that the Due Process Clause imposes substantive limits on the 
imposition of “grossly excessive” punitive damages awards). 
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too large, not that it was unexpected.50 Indeed, both of the dissents in BMW 
explicitly characterized the majority’s evasive opinion as grounded in 
substantive due process,51 and the majority was unwilling or unable to directly 
take issue with that characterization. 
Seven years later, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell, when the Court struck down an award of punitive damages as 
unconstitutionally excessive for a second time, it again paid lip service to the 
procedural notion of inadequate notice, and it again failed to acknowledge 
explicitly that it was relying on substantive due process.52 Yet it was again 
unwilling or unable to disagree with the dissenting opinions’ characterization 
of its holding as grounded in substantive due process.53 
It would appear that the Court’s choice to couch its substantive decisions in 
BMW and Campbell in procedural terms was the product of a defensive and not 
particularly convincing effort to ward off comparisons to Lochner.54 After all, 
there is nothing controversial or arguably oxymoronic about procedural due 
process, and a vigorous protection of procedural rights, even in economic cases, 
does not invite unwelcome analogies to the Lochner era. 
Given that the Court had been ashamed of its reliance on substantive due 
process in the cases leading up to Williams and had gone to such extremes to 
disguise it, it is not surprising that it sought to couch its Williams holding in 
procedural terms as well. And it is equally unsurprising that the dissenting 
Justices did not believe a word of it. “It matters not,” wrote Justice Thomas, 
“that the Court styles today’s holding as ‘procedural,’ because the ‘procedural’ 
rule is simply a confusing implementation of the substantive due process 
 
50.  See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 585-86 (“[W]e are fully convinced that the grossly excessive 
award imposed in this case transcends the constitutional limit.”); id. at 575 n.24 (relying on 
the “principle that punishment should fit the crime”). 
51.  See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
52.  See 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003). 
53.  See id. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
54.  See Zipursky, supra note 7, at 117-18 (“[Justice Stevens] apparently felt pressure to tie the 
striking down of damages under the Due Process Clause to a familiar procedural concept: 
‘notice.’ . . . And yet little or none of the analysis that follows addresses the issue of notice, at 
least not in any clear way.”). 
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regime this Court has created for punitive damages.”55 Commentators have 
tended to agree.56 
The majority opinion does, indeed, read in places as though the claimed 
reliance on procedural due process was simply window dressing for what was 
in reality a substantive decision. The opinion can be read to suggest that the 
Court believed the “procedural” due process violation to be the trial court’s 
failure either to issue the defendant’s requested instruction to the jury to 
punish only for the harm done to the plaintiff57 or to implement alternative 
procedures capable of ensuring that the defendant would not be punished for 
the harm to third parties.58 It is surely true that the failure to issue a requested 
jury instruction can be thought of as a procedural due process violation.59 In 
circumstances like these, however, doing so only confuses the issue. The failure 
to give a jury instruction can violate due process only if the defendant has an 
underlying right to the limitation that the instruction seeks to place upon the 
jury. That underlying right could be a procedural one, but it could also be a 
substantive one. For instance, the failure to give an acceptable reasonable doubt 
instruction in a criminal trial violates procedural due process,60 but that is 
because a criminal defendant has a procedural due process right to a 
 
55.  Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1067 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see 
also id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for boldly “announc[ing] its new 
rule of substantive law” and for failing to heed the Court’s traditional reluctance to expand 
the substantive due process doctrine). 
56.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 18 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, at xi, xii (2007) (describing Williams as a substantive due process case); 
F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards: “Morals 
Without Technique”?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 355-56 (2008); Sheila B. Scheuerman & Anthony 
J. Franze, Instructing Juries on Punitive Damages: Due Process Revisited After Philip Morris v. 
Williams, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 7 n.28, 54, on file with 
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071073; Douglas W. Kmiec, Up in Smoke: 
The Supreme Court Loses Its Unanimity, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2007, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2160286 (describing the majority’s invocation of procedural due 
process as a “legal fig leaf” to cover what was really an indefensible use of substantive due 
process). 
57.  See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1064 (“It is constitutionally important for a court to provide 
assurance that the jury will ask the right question, not the wrong one.”). 
58.  See id. at 1065 (“Although the States have some flexibility to determine what kind of 
procedures they will implement [to protect against punishment for harm to third parties], 
federal constitutional law obligates them to provide some form of protection in appropriate 
cases.”). 
59.  See, e.g., Andrew C. Jayne, The Impact of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Punitive Damages 
Jurisprudence on Oklahoma’s Punitive Damages Statute and Jury Instructions, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 
873, 888 (2004). 
60.  See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). 
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heightened standard of proof.61 By contrast, the failure to instruct a jury that, 
for instance, it must find actual malice before imposing liability on a 
newspaper for defaming a public official might also be thought of as a 
procedural due process violation, insofar as an important procedural 
safeguard—a jury instruction that conforms to the Constitution—was ignored. 
But the missing instruction was warranted only because the defendant has a 
substantive free speech right (imposed by the First Amendment and 
incorporated against the states through substantive due process) to make false 
statements about the official conduct of public officials in the absence of actual 
malice.62 In such circumstances, the failure to properly charge the jury in reality 
constitutes a denial of a substantive right, not a procedural one.63 
The focus on the failure to give the proper jury instruction thus obscures 
the question of whether Williams was truly grounded in procedural or 
substantive due process. What ultimately matters is the constitutional source of 
the underlying right sought to be protected by that instruction—the right not 
to be punished for the harm done to third parties through an award of punitive 
damages. 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens labeled this new right a “rule of substantive 
law.”64 He did not articulate a basis for that assertion, but there was in fact 
good reason for it. When the Court previously hinted in Campbell that it might 
find a constitutional problem with total harm punitive damages, it implied that 
the constitutional infirmity was a matter of substantive due process. It intimated 
that the reason why “[d]ue process does not permit courts, in the calculation of 
punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims 
against a defendant” is that “[p]unishment on these bases creates the 
possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct.”65 
Unjust multiple punishment for the same conduct is generally understood to 
be a substantive due process problem—a concern that the piling on will result 
in excessive cumulative punishment.66 It was this substantive concern that 
seemed to be motivating the Court in Campbell when it first suggested the 
 
61.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
62.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
63.  See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394-97 (1967) (finding a First Amendment violation—
not a procedural due process violation—in the failure to issue an actual malice instruction). 
64.  Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1067 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
65.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003). 
66.  See, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 51 (Tex. 1998) (opining 
that at some “point multiple punitive damages awards arising from the same course of 
conduct are unconstitutional as a matter of substantive due process”). 
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possibility that the Constitution mandates that punitive damages cannot be 
used to punish the defendant for harm caused to third parties. 
But if it was this fear of excessive multiple punishment that motivated the 
Williams Court—if the dissenters are right that the Court’s decision was 
actually grounded in substantive due process—then the Court’s holding is 
virtually indefensible. If the constitutional infirmity of total harm punitive 
damages is a substantive one, based on the fact that multiple awards of them 
can lead to excessive punishment, then they can be unconstitutional only when 
they are awarded more than once; a single award of total harm punitive 
damages that accurately punishes the defendant for the full scope of harm 
caused by its wrongful conduct is not unconstitutionally excessive.67 
In other words, the fear of excessive multiple punishment does not 
automatically and categorically amount to a substantive due process violation. 
Rather, the potential for multiple punishment crosses the threshold of 
unconstitutionality as a matter of substantive due process only when it leads to 
actual excessive multiple punishment. Whether that threshold has been crossed 
in any given case depends on the individual circumstances of that case: the size 
of the award, the size of the prior awards for the same conduct, whether the 
jury or the judge has adequately adjusted the current award to take into 
account the prior awards, and other such factors. 
Yet the Court’s decision in Williams was categorical. The Williams Court 
expressly declined to reach the question whether the actual amount of punitive 
damages awarded to the plaintiff was unduly excessive;68 it held only that, 
regardless of the amount, the punitive award was inherently unconstitutional 
because it was born of an attempt to punish the defendant for harm to 
nonparties. Indeed, it would have been virtually nonsensical for the Court to 
strike down the punitive award in Williams on multiple punishment grounds, 
given that no allegation was made that the defendant had ever been punished 
in prior cases for the same wrongful conduct. There had been no multiple 
punishment at all. 
The substantive due process argument is thus untenable. Accordingly, 
when the Williams Court claimed that it was relying on procedural due process, 
it must have really meant it (unless its holding was utterly unsupportable). 
This time, unlike with BMW and Campbell, the accusations of improperly 
 
67.  See Colby, supra note 9, at 658-66. 
68.  See 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (“[W]e shall not decide whether the award here at issue is ‘grossly 
excessive.’”). BMW and Campbell, by contrast, had found that, even in the absence of 
multiple punishments, the actual amounts of punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff 
were unconstitutionally excessive. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 412, 429; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996). 
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smuggling substantive due process constraints in procedural dressing miss the 
mark. 
 
B. The Williams Court’s Inadequate Basis for Finding a Procedural Due Process 
Violation 
But was there really a procedural due process violation?69 According to the 
Court, punishing the defendant for harm to nonparties violates procedural due 
process for two reasons. First, it denies the defendant the opportunity to 
present individualized defenses with regard to those nonparties; and second, it 
raises the risk of arbitrariness in the amount of punitive damages because the 
generalized evidence at trial will not allow the jury to determine precisely the 
number of victims or the extent or circumstances of their injuries.70 
 
69.  Along the lines of the jury instruction point just discussed, one could argue that it violates 
procedural due process to fail to institute some sort of procedural safeguard designed to 
protect against substantively excessive multiple punishment. See Scheuerman & Franze, 
supra note 56, at 7 n.28, 54; cf. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961) 
(noting that a property owner “is deprived of due process of law if he is compelled to 
relinquish [his property] without assurance that he will not be held liable again . . . in a suit 
brought by a claimant who is not bound by the first judgment”). In other words, one could 
argue that even if there was no substantive due process violation on the particular facts of 
this case, there is an inherent procedural due process violation in the failure to systematically 
protect against substantive due process violations in cases of this sort. But even if such a 
failure is itself best viewed as a procedural, rather than a substantive, due process violation, 
it is difficult to see how it could have formed the basis of the Court’s decision in Williams. In 
Oregon—the state from which the Williams case arose—statute “requires a jury to consider 
evidence of punishments already imposed on the defendant when it considers the amount of 
an award of punitive damages.” Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 92 P.3d 126, 142 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2004). Thus, according to the Oregon Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court’s “concern 
in [Campbell] about multiple punitive damages awards that would be excessive in total is 
ameliorated by Oregon law.” Id. Whether the requirement to inform the jury of prior 
awards would indeed be adequate in most cases to ameliorate the potential for multiple 
punishments to produce substantively excessive awards is certainly debatable. But the 
Supreme Court in Williams never expressly found this procedural safeguard to be 
inadequate; indeed, it never discussed it at all. And it would have been highly problematic 
for the Court to base its decision on these grounds without some showing that the Oregon 
law in practice has not succeeded in protecting against excessive cumulative punishment. A 
case in which the Oregon procedural safeguard had not yet even had the opportunity to 
come into play is hardly the proper vehicle for striking that safeguard down as 
constitutionally inadequate. One would think that the Court would do so only in a 
subsequent case in which a jury awarded a massive amount of punitive damages despite 
having been informed of a prior monumental verdict. 
70.  See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063. 
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As I have previously argued in some detail, these concerns are very real, and 
they pose a serious risk of unfairness to the defendant in cases of this sort. It 
can be profoundly unfair to require a defendant to pay punitive damages for 
wronging thousands of individuals in the absence of evidence sufficient to 
show that it did, in fact, commit legal wrongs against each of those third 
parties and without giving it a meaningful chance to defend against those 
alleged third-party claims.71 Still, the Court was too hasty in concluding that 
these arguments are sufficient in themselves to establish a procedural due 
process violation.72 
Let us first consider the Court’s secondary concern that “to permit 
punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add a near standardless 
dimension to the punitive damages equation.”73 The Court asked, 
 
How many such victims are there? How seriously were they injured? 
Under what circumstances did injury occur? The trial will not likely 
answer such questions as to nonparty victims. The jury will be left to 
speculate. And the fundamental due process concerns to which our 
punitive damages cases refer—risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty and 
lack of notice—will be magnified.74 
 
It is undeniably true that concerns for judicial economy would ordinarily 
preclude the parties from introducing at trial detailed and individualized 
evidence as to the specific circumstances of each of the numerous nonparty 
victims’ injuries. But why does punishment in the absence of such evidence rise 
to the level of a procedural due process violation? That is the key question, and 
the Court had nothing to say about it; it simply assumed the conclusion—and a 
questionable one at that. The plaintiff would surely be required, at a minimum, 
to bring in credible evidence (perhaps in the form of expert testimony or 
statistical studies) establishing the likely number of victims and the severity of 
the average injury. Our law has long accepted the fact that even in the criminal 
law—where due process concerns are at their apex—the magnitude of a 
sentence for harming large numbers of persons can be calculated through just 
 
71.  See Colby, supra note 9, at 592-602, 650-57. 
72.  This was a question on which I had reserved judgment in my prior article. See id. at 602. 
73.  Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063. 
74.  Id. 
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this type of approximation.75 How can it violate due process to calculate civil 
punitive damages in the same manner? 
That leaves the Court’s primary concern: that punishing for harm to third 
parties unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of the opportunity to present 
individualized defenses related to the alleged nonparty victims. Using the facts 
of Williams itself as an example, the Court explained that Philip Morris might 
not actually be liable for many of the harms to other smokers for which it was 
punished, because many of the other smokers likely did not rely on its 
fraudulent statements or were fully aware of the dangers of smoking. Those 
smokers may have been injured by Philip Morris’ products, but they were not 
defrauded by its actions; Philip Morris was not legally responsible for their 
injuries, and thus there was no warrant for punishing Philip Morris for having 
wrongfully harmed them. Yet Philip Morris had no opportunity at trial to 
establish these defenses for each individual victim; there were countless 
thousands of smokers in Oregon, each of whom had a separate story to tell, 
and none of whom (except Mr. Williams, through his wife) was before the 
court to tell it. For this reason, the Court held that Philip Morris was denied its 
right to due process when the jury punished it for the harm that its products 
caused to every single in-state smoker.76 
In the same breath, however, the Court qualified its holding that the 
defendant cannot be punished for the harm caused to third parties by declaring 
that the plaintiff can still introduce evidence of such harm, because the fact that 
others were also harmed shows that the defendant’s conduct was particularly 
reprehensible and warranted higher punitive damages.77 As Anthony Sebok 
explains, this exception is fundamentally inconsistent with the majority’s 
rationale for its primary rule: 
 
The problem with the plaintiff’s jury instructions in Philip Morris, 
according to the Court, was that they allowed the jury to decide 
whether the defendant had legally harmed smokers who had not sued 
and whose cases were not properly presented to the jury. But how 
 
75.  See, e.g., United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 192 (2d Cir. 2004) (“A reasonable estimate of 
the loss [to the many victims] is all that is necessary [to calculate the sentence].”); U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4 n.2 (2007); see also id. § 2B1.1 n.3(C) (providing 
that the fine for corporate fraud is calculated by estimating “[t]he approximate number of 
victims multiplied by the average loss to each victim,” and can even be based on “[m]ore 
general factors, such as the scope and duration of the offense and revenues generated by 
similar operations”). 
76.  See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063-64. 
77.  See id. at 1064. 
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could that problem be cured by an instruction that allowed the jury to 
enhance its punishment of the defendant for what it did to the plaintiff 
on the basis of its conduct towards others? Wouldn’t that require 
making a judgment about hypothetical cases—e.g., cases that involved 
claims of legal wrongs by the defendant in relation to persons who 
were not part of the case?78 
 
Given the exception, the Court’s asserted rationale for its decision—that there 
is a procedural due process deficiency in calibrating punishment by reference to 
the harm to third parties in the absence of individualized evidence and defenses 
related to those third parties—cannot explain or justify the Court’s holding. 
More importantly—even leaving aside the contradiction between the 
announced exception and the articulated rationale for the rule—the Court’s 
central assertion that it is unconstitutional to punish a defendant for harm to 
third parties without affording it the opportunity to raise individualized 
defenses is subject to a foundational objection. Justice Stevens argued in 
dissent that there was no need to provide Philip Morris with the opportunity to 
establish defenses related to the peculiarities of other smokers’ claims because 
Philip Morris was not being ordered to compensate those other smokers. “To 
award compensatory damages to remedy such third-party harm might well 
constitute a taking of property from the defendant without due process,” 
explained Justice Stevens.79 “But a punitive damages award, instead of serving 
a compensatory purpose, serves the entirely different purposes of retribution 
and deterrence that underlie every criminal sanction.”80 Compensatory 
damages are designed to redress individual wrongs, and therefore the 
defendant cannot be ordered to pay them without being afforded the 
opportunity to present every defense that it has to each of those individual 
allegations of wrongdoing. Punitive damages, on the other hand, are, like 
criminal sanctions, designed to punish and deter. They have nothing to do 
with the private, individual wrongs done to the nonparties; rather, they punish 
the defendant for the public wrong done to all of society. As Justice Stevens 
argued, “Whereas compensatory damages are measured by the harm the 
defendant has caused the plaintiff, punitive damages are a sanction for the 
public harm the defendant’s conduct has caused or threatened.”81 
 
78.  Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 999 (2007) 
(footnote omitted). 
79.  Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
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Justice Stevens is surely right that there is no due process problem with 
punishing the defendant for the harm that it did to society as a whole without 
affording individualized defenses for each and every victim. That is why the 
criminal law permits a sentence to be calculated on the basis of a rough 
approximation of the number of people harmed and the average harm to each 
victim.82 When punishing public wrongs, the judicial system does not care 
whether the defendant would be liable to each and every one of its alleged 
victims in tort. It cares only that the defendant engaged in reprehensible 
conduct and that society suffered as a result. There is no constitutional 
obligation to calibrate the degree of societal harm with individualized 
precision. 
Justice Stevens’s argument thus cannot easily be dismissed. If, as Justice 
Stevens claims, punitive damages punish public wrongs—if he is correct that 
they are essentially a form of “criminal sanction”83—then a defendant that is 
forced to pay a rough approximation of total harm punitive damages generally 
cannot claim that it has been denied the opportunity to present its defenses. It 
had every opportunity to defend not only against the plaintiff’s claim that it 
committed a private wrong (and was thus liable for compensatory damages), 
but also against the plaintiff’s claim that it committed a public wrong (and was 
thus liable for punitive damages), and it lost on both accounts. In Williams 
itself, Philip Morris was in no way hindered from presenting a defense against 
the allegation that it “acted with malice or has shown a reckless and outrageous 
indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and has acted with a 
conscious indifference to the health, safety and welfare of others”—the Oregon 
standard for liability for punitive damages.84 The jury did not buy it; it found, 
notwithstanding Philip Morris’s vigorous defense, that Philip Morris had 
committed a malicious or reckless wrong upon society that caused or 
threatened significant harm to the public. It was only after that defense failed 
that Philip Morris was forced to pay the punitive damages for which the jury 
found it liable. And those damages were, by definition, designed to punish it 
for the full scope of the harm that its public wrong caused or threatened to 
society. As Justice Stevens noted,  
 
[T]here is no reason why the measure of the appropriate punishment 
for engaging in a campaign of deceit in distributing a poisonous and 
addictive substance to thousands of cigarette smokers statewide 
 
82.  See supra note 75. 
83.  Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
84.  OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537 (1997) (currently codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730 (2007)). 
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should not include consideration of the harm to those “bystanders” as 
well as the harm to the individual plaintiff.85 
 
The majority’s reasoning makes sense only if—contrary to Justice Stevens’s 
assertion—punitive damages are not a form of punishment for public wrongs 
to society.86 For the majority to be correct, Justice Stevens must be incorrect in 
asserting that the award of punitive damages against Philip Morris was 
properly intended to serve as “a sanction for the public harm the defendant’s 
conduct has caused.”87 But Justice Stevens was not going out on a limb in 
making that assertion. To the contrary, he was simply echoing the 
conventional judicial wisdom that punitive damages “serve as punishment for 
what amounts to a public wrong”88—punishment “for the wrong committed 
upon society.”89 As one court recently commented, “The plaintiff remains a 
party, but the de facto party is our society, and the jury is determining whether 
and to what extent we as a society should punish the defendant.”90 Indeed, just 
four years before Williams, the Supreme Court itself had declared that punitive 
damages “serve the same purposes as criminal penalties,”91 the very raison d’être 
of which is, of course, to punish public wrongs on behalf of society.92 
The Williams majority never directly took issue with the conventional 
wisdom that punitive damages are punishment for public wrongs. In fact, in 
 
85.  Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
86.  If—contra Justice Stevens—punitive damages punish private wrongs, not public ones, then 
the Williams majority’s constitutional reasoning makes perfect sense. As I have previously 
explained, it is surely unconstitutional to punish a defendant for a series of individual, 
private, tortious wrongs without providing evidence that it did indeed commit each alleged 
private wrong, and without affording the defendant the opportunity to raise individualized 
defenses for each alleged wrong. See Colby, supra note 9, at 650-57. 
87.  Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
88.  Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also Wayne A. Logan, 
Civil and Criminal Recidivists: Extraterritoriality in Tort and Crime, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1609, 
1610 (2005) (“[L]ike criminal sanctions, punitive damages have come to be viewed as a 
means to address ‘public wrongs’ . . . .”). 
89.  Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Okla. 1991). This was the explicit 
understanding of the Oregon courts, which helps to explain why the Oregon Supreme 
Court in Williams did not see a problem with punishing the defendant for harm to 
nonparties. See DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232, 1243 (Or. 2002) (“Oregon courts 
view[] the punitive and deterrent effect of punitive damages as vindicating interests of 
society in general, and not of any plaintiff in particular.”). 
90.  Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 145 (Ohio 2002). 
91.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003). 
92.  See infra Section IV.A. 
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declaring that the plaintiff can still introduce evidence of third-party harm, the 
majority seemed implicitly to agree that punitive damages vindicate the public 
interest by punishing public wrongs. The Court explained that “[e]vidence of 
actual harm to nonparties” is admissible because it “can help to show that the 
conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the 
general public.”93 Indeed, declared the Court, even when third parties were not 
actually harmed, a larger award of punitive damages is justified when the 
defendant’s conduct “nonetheless posed a grave risk [of harm] to the public.”94 
Those statements seem to imply that the purpose of a punitive damages award 
is to redress the wrong to society by punishing the defendant for the harm that 
it caused—or threatened to cause—to the general public. 
The majority opinion thus gives the appearance of theoretical incoherence. 
The Court’s exception is inconsistent with the announced rationale for its rule. 
And more fundamentally, the conclusion that due process is violated if the 
defendant is punished for harm to third parties without being able to introduce 
individualized defenses is dependent on the predicate notion that punitive 
damages are a form of individualized sanction, rather than a form of 
punishment for public wrongs; yet the Court reached that conclusion in an 
opinion that elsewhere suggests that punitive damages are indeed punishment 
for the harm to the public—for public wrongs. 
The Court’s reasoning was thus insufficient to justify its holding that 
punishing the defendant for harm to nonparties violates procedural due 
process. In fact, that holding cannot be defended without confronting the 
distinction between public and private wrongs that appears to have eluded the 
Court. Parts III and IV aim to salvage the Court’s holding by doing just that. 
i i i .  past:  punitive damages as punishment for private 
wrongs 
I have previously developed in great detail an argument that, historically, 
punitive damages—when they were used as a form of genuine punishment—
served as punishment for private, rather than public, wrongs.95 Nineteenth-
century courts were quite explicit in holding that “the damages allowed in a 
 
93.  Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1064 (2007). 
94.  Id.; see also id. (approving of the Oregon Supreme Court’s observation that the “‘jury could 
consider whether Williams and his misfortune were merely exemplars of the harm that 
Philip Morris was prepared to inflict on the smoking public at large’” (quoting Williams v. 
Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1175 (Or. 2006))). 
95.  See Colby, supra note 9, at 613-43. 
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civil case by way of punishment[] have no necessary relation to the penalty 
incurred for the wrong done to the public,” but rather are imposed “as a 
punishment for the wrong done to the individual.”96 Thus, nineteenth-century 
case law “makes the distinction between the punishment for the wrong done 
the public, for which the punishment is inflicted in the criminal action, and 
that done to the individual, for which punishment may be imposed by the jury 
in the civil action.”97 As one court explained, “Considered as strictly punitory, 
the damages are for the punishment of the private tort, not of the public 
crime.”98 As such, an individual victim was not permitted to punish the 
defendant for the harm done to society or to nonparties.99 
Of course, punitive damages have evolved since then. They have come to 
serve the very different purpose of punishing public wrongs. Justice Stevens 
was correct in noting that total harm punitive damages—as punishment for 
public wrongs—are now the norm (or at least they were before the Court 
perfunctorily struck them down in Williams). But I intend to establish here 
that, when punitive damages are employed as a form of punishment, the 
narrow historical conception of punitive damages as punishment for private 
 
96.  Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 391 (1866) (emphasis omitted). 
97.  Hauser v. Griffith, 71 N.W. 223, 223 (Iowa 1897). 
98.  Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 288 (1878). 
99.  See Colby, supra note 9, at 620-27. Benjamin Zipursky argues that my “history is probably 
distorted and incomplete” because “punitive damages traditionally served multiple 
purposes”—not just as punishment for private wrongs. Zipursky, supra note 7, at 143; see 
also Sebok, supra note 78, at 1004 (“I have detailed elsewhere at least six different functions 
that courts attributed to punitive damages in the period examined by Colby . . . .”). It is 
certainly true that punitive damages historically served a variety of purposes, as Sebok has 
masterfully demonstrated. See Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why 
Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 
(2003). That is a point that I at least partially acknowledged in my prior article, see Colby, 
supra note 9, at 622-29, and Sebok’s work makes it even more clear that one cannot distill a 
single unifying purpose and theory behind the disjointed and often contradictory pastiche of 
early punitive damages decisions. It was therefore unwise and probably misleading for me 
to refer on occasion in my prior article to punishment for private wrongs as “the historical 
conception” of punitive damages. E.g., Colby, supra note 9, at 652 (emphasis added). But 
the key point for my argument was and is that the courts settled on an understanding of 
punitive damages as punishment for individual, private wrongs when they confronted the 
fundamental constitutional questions that surrounded (and still surround) punitive 
damages—in particular the question of why double jeopardy principles are not violated 
when a victim is allowed to receive punitive damages for conduct that has already been 
criminally punished by the state. The courts relied on the notion of punitive damages as 
punishment for private wrongs as the justification for resolving those questions in favor of 
the constitutionality of punitive damages. See id. at 620-28. As such, I believe that this 
notion is the particular historical understanding of punitive damages that matters most in 
ascertaining their constitutionality—and the constitutional constraints upon them—today. 
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wrongs is constitutionally mandated; to employ punitive damages as 
punishment for public wrongs without affording all of the procedural 
safeguards that the Constitution would mandate if the same penalty were 
being sought as a criminal fine violates procedural due process.100 That, I 
submit, is the true reason why imposing punitive damages as punishment for 
harm to third parties violates procedural due process. And thus, that is the best 
justification for the result in Williams. 
The argument begins by observing that, even in the nineteenth century, the 
constitutionality of punitive damages was highly dubious. Critics questioned 
how the Constitution could fairly be interpreted to permit a form of judicially 
imposed punishment without affording the defendant the benefits of the 
criminal procedural safeguards mandated by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments (and their state law equivalents).101 The best 
known and most bilious of those many critics, Justice Foster of the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, queried, 
 
Why longer tolerate a false doctrine, which, in its practical 
exemplification, deprives a defendant of his constitutional right of 
indictment or complaint on oath before being called into court? 
deprives him of the right of meeting the witnesses against him face to 
face? deprives him of the right of not being compelled to testify 
against himself? deprives him of the right of being acquitted, unless 
the proof of his offence is established beyond all reasonable doubt? 
deprives him of the right of not being punished twice for the same 
offence? 
 
100.  When I previously took a very cursory (and unsatisfactory) stab at that task, see Colby, supra 
note 9, at 643-50, my effort was easily mistaken for an essentially originalist argument that 
“history carries dispositive weight in defining constitutional rights.” Zipursky, supra note 7, 
at 142-43; see also Sebok, supra note 78, at 1005 n.213 (“It is an understatement to say that 
Colby’s argument relies on a controversial originalist interpretation of the Constitution.”). 
As this Part seeks to explain, my argument is not, in fact, originalist. Rather, it is grounded 
in part in a necessary limitation on the originalist argument that the courts—especially the 
Supreme Court—have employed in upholding the constitutionality of punitive damages. 
That is to say, it is the courts that have chosen to defend the constitutionality of punitive 
damages on purely originalist grounds; the argument here is that, even if one accepts the 
propriety of an originalist defense, that defense demonstrably does not establish the 
constitutionality of total harm punitive damages. 
101.  See, e.g., Lewis Lawrence Smith, Punitive Damages, 41 AM. L. REG. & REV. 517, 518 (1893) 
(“[T]he unfortunate defendant is not only not permitted to ask to have this anomalous 
crime, for such it amounts to, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but is denied many other 
rights accorded to the lowest criminal.”). 
392.COLBY.479.DOC 12/22/2008  1:18:43 PM 
clearing the smoke from philip morris v. williams 
417 
 
    Punitive damages destroy every constitutional safeguard within 
their reach.102 
 
When courts confronted these arguments, they rejected them on the lone 
ground that punitive damages were well established in the law, and a “rule so 
long and so generally established is a sin against sound judicial principle, not 
against the constitution.”103 Even the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the history 
to deflect these objections. As early as 1851, the Court wrote, “We are aware 
that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by some writers; but if 
repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are to be received as the best 
exposition of what the law is, the question will not admit of argument.”104 
After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court based its 
assertion that “[t]he imposition of punitive or exemplary damages in [civil] 
cases cannot be opposed as in conflict with the prohibition against the 
deprivation of property without due process of law,” and “cannot therefore be 
justly assailed as infringing upon the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States,” on the sole ground that the “propriety and 
legality [of punitive damages] have been recognized . . . by repeated judicial 
decisions for more than a century.”105 
A century later, the constitutional attack on punitive damages resumed. 
Commentators again charged that punitive damages are unconstitutional 
because they impose punishment without affording criminal procedural 
protections.106 In 1990, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pacific Mutual 
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip107 to consider, among other questions, whether 
punitive damages “although nominally civil, must be considered sufficiently 
criminal in nature . . . to entitle [the defendant] to certain protections under 
 
102.  Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1873). 
103.  Brown, 44 Wis. at 282, 288; see also, e.g., Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me. 539, 543 (1861); Duckett v. 
Pool, 13 S.E. 542, 547 (S.C. 1891). 
104.  Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851); see also Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. 
v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 492-93 (1875) (“[A]lthough some text-writers and courts have 
questioned its soundness, it has been accepted as the general rule in England and in most of 
the States of this country.”). 
105.  Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 36 (1889). 
106.  See, e.g., Jeffery W. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 241 (1985); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages 
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983). 
107.  499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”108 
As it had done a hundred years before, the Court rejected that argument on the 
sole ground that “the common-law method for assessing punitive damages was 
well established before the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted” and 
“[n]othing in that Amendment’s text or history indicates an intention on the 
part of its drafters to overturn the prevailing method.”109 It was only because of 
“this consistent history”—because “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has not 
displaced the procedure of the ages”—that the Court found no procedural due 
process violation: “If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by 
common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to 
affect it.”110 As Justice Kennedy emphasized in his concurrence, “[T]he 
judgment of history should govern the outcome in the case before us.”111 
Whether or not this historically grounded, originalist defense of the 
constitutionality of punitive damages is a good one, it remains the only defense 
that the courts have ever offered to the charge that punitive damages are 
unconstitutional for failing to provide criminal procedural safeguards.112 And, 
 
108.  Brief of Petitioner at i, Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (No. 89-1279). Citing Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 
397 (1873), quoted above, the Court explained that it granted certiorari “to review the 
punitive damages procedures and award in the light of the long-enduring debate about their 
propriety.” Haslip, 499 U.S. at 8. 
109.  Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17-18. 
110.  Id. (citations omitted). The Court went on to note that it would be “inappropriate to say 
that, because punitive damages have been recognized for so long, their imposition is never 
unconstitutional.” Id. at 18. It thus proceeded to consider the fairness of the actual punitive 
damages award in the case before it. See id. at 18-24. But its basic holding that punitive 
damages are not categorically unconstitutional despite their failure to provide criminal 
procedural protections was based solely on their historical pedigree. In Zipursky’s words, 
“the majority opinion comfortably gave presumptive weight to history in its due process 
analysis.” Zipursky, supra note 7, at 114. 
111.  Haslip, 499 U.S. at 40 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Similarly, the Court’s holding in 
Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), that the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to punitive damages was largely 
grounded in the originalist argument that “the Framers of the Eighth Amendment did not 
expressly intend it to apply to damages awards made by civil juries.” Id. at 273. The Court 
recognized, in nonoriginalist fashion, that there are some occasions in which the Eighth 
Amendment should be expanded to cover new punishments not envisioned by the Framers. 
But this was not one of them: “This aspect of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence might 
have some force here were punitive damages a strictly modern creation, without solid 
grounding in pre-Revolutionary days. But . . . [the punitive damages] doctrine was 
expressly recognized in cases as early as 1763.” Id. at 273-74. 
112.  In fact, courts have long suggested that, were it not for history, they would find punitive 
damages to be unconstitutional. See Colby, supra note 9, at 645-46 (collecting cases). In 
1884, the Colorado Supreme Court actually found punitive damages unconstitutional 
precisely because they punish the defendant without affording the procedural protections of 
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for two reasons, it is necessarily dependent on an understanding of punitive 
damages as punishment for private wrongs. 
First, as a matter of both sound logic and sound constitutional reasoning, 
even if we accept the propriety of originalism, the constitutionality of a current 
practice can be grounded in its long historical pedigree only if the practice that 
is being defended today is essentially the same practice that enjoys the long 
historical pedigree. The Court has, for instance, upheld the constitutionality of 
obscenity laws in large part on the basis of their long tradition of historical 
acceptance.113 But of course a state could not pass a law redefining “obscenity” 
to include any speech critical of the Governor and then rely on the cases 
upholding obscenity bans on historical grounds as an absolute justification for 
the new law. Even if we accept the basic claim that history justifies exempting 
obscenity from the rules that would otherwise govern the regulation of speech 
under the First Amendment, an “obscenity” ban that goes well beyond what 
was historically encompassed by that term—to an entirely different kind of 
speech—would have no claim to a valid defense grounded in history simply 
because it co-opts an old historical label. 
The same is true of punitive damages. As I have previously written, the 
 
fact that the historical institution of punitive damages has been around 
for centuries . . . does not . . . mean that any remedy that a modern 
court chooses to call ‘punitive damages’ is automatically 
constitutional. If the courts completely change the fundamental nature 
of the institution of punitive damages, slapping the old label on them 
will not avoid all questions of constitutional infirmity.114  
 
 
a criminal trial. See Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 120-21 (Colo. 1884). Colorado was a rare 
state in which the question was still an open one in the late nineteenth century, allowing the 
court to decide it as a matter of first impression, unencumbered by dubious historical 
precedents. The court surmised that “[w]ere this subject now presented to the various 
[other] courts of the country for the first time, we have little doubt as to what the verdict 
would be.” Id. at 120; see also Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1073-74 
(Wash. 1891) (addressing the issue anew, “untrammeled by former decisions,” and 
concluding that, because “many of the time-honored rules governing the trial of criminal 
actions, and of the rights that have been secured to defendants in criminal actions from the 
time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, are absolutely ignored,” 
punitive damages are “repugnant to every sense of justice” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
113.  See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957). 
114.  Colby, supra note 9, at 647. 
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When the Supreme Court, in the nineteenth century, upheld punitive damages 
based on their historical pedigree, it understood them to punish “the wrong 
done to the plaintiff”115—that is, to be imposed “for the redress of private 
wrongs.”116 If the courts change the very nature of punitive damages from 
punishment for private wrongs to individuals to punishment for public wrongs 
to society, then they can no longer rely on history as an absolute constitutional 
shield—even if they choose to be originalists. 
There is a second, related reason why the historical pedigree defense of the 
constitutionality of punitive damages is dependent upon the conception of 
punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs. Why did nineteenth-
century courts declare that punitive damages are punishment for private 
wrongs? That conception was well grounded in the emerging understanding of 
the unique nature and role of punitive damages,117 but the courts did not 
coalesce around it or articulate it clearly until they were forced to do so to 
deflect constitutional attacks—in particular, to deflect the argument that, to 
avoid unconstitutional double jeopardy, punitive damages should not be 
allowed where the defendant’s conduct was also punished as a crime. The 
rejoinder to that argument that prevailed in the courts was that there was no 
double jeopardy violation because the defendant was not being punished twice 
for the same offense. Each punishment was for a distinct legal wrong—the 
criminal punishment for the public wrong to society, and the civil punishment 
for the private wrong to the plaintiff.118 “In this view,” explained one court, 
“the awarding of punitive damages can in no just sense be said to be in conflict 
with the constitutional or common law inhibition against inflicting two 
punishments for the same offense.”119 If punitive damages had been 
understood at the time as punishment for public wrongs, the courts would 
have struck them down.120 
In other words, it was only because punitive damages punished a private 
wrong legally distinct from the public wrong that is punished by the criminal 
 
115.  Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851). 
116.  Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885). 
117.  See infra Part IV. 
118.  See Colby, supra note 9, at 621-22. 
119.  Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 391 (1866); see also, e.g., Zick v. Smith, 112 A. 846, 
846 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1921) (arguing that the double jeopardy argument “is illogical” because 
the “criminal action is a punishment for the wrong done to the public” whereas the 
“punitive damages [award] is a punishment for the wrong done to the individual”), aff’d, 
116 A. 927 (N.J. 1922). 
120.  Indeed, a few courts did just that before the notion of punishment for private wrongs 
triumphed in punitive damages law. See Colby, supra note 9, at 620 & n.130. 
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law—and because they had been around for a long time in that limited form—
that the courts historically upheld their constitutionality. History, therefore, 
provides no basis for upholding the constitutionality of punitive damages 
conceived, as by the Williams dissent (and perhaps the Williams majority as 
well), as punishment for public wrongs. And yet history is the only defense 
that the Supreme Court has ever offered in response to these fundamental 
constitutional objections. 
 
iv.  present:  procedural due process and punishment for 
private wrongs 
Of course, it is possible that total harm punitive damages as punishment 
for public wrongs can continue to stand on firm constitutional footing even 
after the mistaken crutch of history is pulled out from under them.121 But this 
Part aims to establish that they cannot. And beyond that, it seeks to provide a 
theoretical justification for the entire notion of punitive damages as 
punishment for private wrongs—a justification that critics of my prior work 
have suggested is lacking.122 Indeed, some critics have gone so far as to opine 
that “the concept of a distinct category of ‘private’ punishment for ‘private’ 
wrongs is, at its foundation, incoherent.”123 This Part seeks to establish that the 
notion of punishment for private wrongs is not simply a nonsensical and 
archaic relic of nineteenth-century thinking that we are left to accept, warts and 
all, if we want to continue to rely on history as a constitutional defense of 
punitive damages. Rather, it is to this day a sensible and theoretically 
defensible notion, and it makes sense both conceptually and doctrinally (rather 
than just historically) to say that punishment for private wrongs—unlike 
punishment for public wrongs—does not necessitate the provision of criminal 
procedural safeguards. Cass Sunstein and others have lamented that our “legal 
culture lacks a full normative account of the relationship between retributive 
goals and punitive damages.”124 This Part seeks to provide that account.125 
 
121.  See Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 
408, 409 (1967) (arguing that the lack of criminal procedural protections can be justified by 
more than simply “the law’s tendency to ‘domesticate’ its inconsistencies—to accept 
contradictions simply because it has lived with them for so long”). 
122.  See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 78, at 1002-04; Zipursky, supra note 7, at 143. 
123.  Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1, 19 n.90 (2004). 
124.  Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with 
Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2085 (1998). 
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125.  The argument in this Part builds upon the important work of Anthony Sebok and Benjamin 
Zipursky. Sebok and Zipursky have each taken great pains to distinguish their recently 
promulgated theories of punitive damages from my own (and each other’s). See Sebok, 
supra note 78, at 1002-06 (seeking to distinguish his theory of punitive damages as private 
revenge from my theory of punitive damages as private punishment); id. at 1025-29 (seeking 
to distinguish his theory from Zipursky’s theory of punitive damages as, in part, vindicating 
a plaintiff’s right to be punitive); Zipursky, supra note 7, at 141-44, 157-58 (seeking to 
distinguish his theory from mine); id. at 147 (seeking to distinguish his theory from 
Sebok’s). But in fact, our theories share a great deal in common. When I say that punitive 
damages are punishment for private wrongs, I mean precisely that punitive damages are a 
form of legally sanctioned private revenge, designed to vindicate a plaintiff’s legal right to be 
punitive in a court of law. 
 Still, while I am deeply indebted to Sebok and Zipursky for adding normative flesh to 
my bare-bones historical argument, I ultimately agree that, although we arrive at nearly the 
same place, and although we share many of the same reasons for preferring that place to the 
alternatives, we take very different routes to get there—and our approaches have very 
different implications for the future of extracompensatory damages. Sebok and Zipursky fit 
their accounts into the “civil recourse” theory of tort law. See Sebok, supra note 78, at 1023-
29; Zipursky, supra note 7, at 151-61. So too does John Goldberg, who also defends a vision 
of punitive damages largely in accordance with the one presented here. See John C.P. 
Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 3, 7 (2004) (arguing that “[w]hat is at stake in [punitive damages] is not [the 
state’s] interest[] in obtaining retribution on behalf of its citizens or in deterring sharp 
business practices, but the [plaintiffs’] interest in vindicating their rights not to be 
mistreated in the way that they were,” which includes “providing them with satisfaction—a 
remedy adequate to acknowledge and avenge [the defendant’s] predatory conduct towards 
them”); see also id. at 4 n.2 (citing my work, and particularly Sebok’s and Zipursky’s, as 
having “heavily influenced” his “thinking on the subject of punitive damages”). The civil 
recourse school is premised on the principle that “the animating idea behind our system of 
tort law” is “that an individual who has been wronged is entitled to an avenue of recourse 
against the wrongdoer.” John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great 
Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (2005). Thus, Goldberg’s and Sebok’s arguments that 
“tort law is not defensible as public regulatory law” are more theoretical than constitutional 
and are sweeping in their normative scope. Goldberg, supra, at 4. Zipursky’s equally 
sweeping argument includes what may be a constitutional bent, but one that is ultimately 
unsatisfying. See infra Section IV.C. 
 My conception of punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs—as legalized 
revenge—is more in harmony with some normative theories of tort law, such as civil 
recourse, than others. Indeed, with its emphasis on vindicating the private rights of the 
plaintiff, it fits comfortably within most corrective justice theories. See, e.g., Richard W. 
Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 159, 175 
(David G. Owen ed., 1997) (arguing that the notion of punitive damages as retribution “for 
the discrete wrong done to a particular individual” accords with corrective justice); see also 
Mark Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 275-84 
(2008) (noting that this conception of punitive damages accords with a compensatory 
theory of tort law). The notion of punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs is 
seemingly less compatible with utility maximization theories that view tort law primarily in 
regulatory terms—as serving a collective public interest, rather than the individual private 
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A. Punishing Private Wrongs: Private Revenge 
The idea of punitive damages as punishment only for private wrongs might 
seem at first blush to be counterintuitive and hypertechnical. Most people 
probably share the instinct of the plaintiff’s counsel in Williams, who insisted 
at oral argument that it makes no sense to suggest that it was inappropriate to 
punish Philip Morris for the harm done to nonparties because “[p]unitive 
damages do not punish for harm, they punish misconduct.”126 That is to say, 
the law punishes a wrongdoer for engaging in wrongful behavior, not for 
causing harm. Either we punish wrongful behavior, or we do not. The 
assertion that punitive damages can punish only the private wrong that arises 
from a wrongful act (the harm to the individual victim), but not the public 
wrong that arises from that same act (the harm to society), has the ring of 
proverbial angels dancing on the head of pin. At first, it seems nonsensical, or 
at least implausibly legalistic, to suggest that tort law can somehow punish 
only the private aspect of the wrongful act, but not the public aspect. How can 
the law isolate only one consequence of wrongful conduct for punishment? 
And in any event, what exactly is the public harm to society other than the 
harm done to the particular victim—an individual in the public community? 
Overcoming these objections requires a deeper exploration of both the 
nature of private wrongs and the nature of punishment itself. 
 
interest of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A 
Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra, at 99, 100-11. 
But cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 869, 948 (1998) (taking into account in economic analysis “the pleasure or 
satisfaction people obtain from seeing blameworthy parties punished”). Insofar as I see 
normative value in using punitive damages to punish private wrongs, see infra Section IV.B, 
I am sympathetic to corrective justice theories in general and to civil recourse in particular. 
But I am also open to the proposition that tort law can sometimes be employed to serve 
solely public, regulatory aims; I do not mean to endorse or rely here upon any particular tort 
theory. My primary argument is that if punitive damages are used as punishment, they must 
serve as punishment for private wrongs, not public ones. That is fundamentally a 
constitutional claim, not a theoretical one. As I make clear in Part V, nothing in Williams, or 
in my own argument, would preclude the use of extracompensatory damages to serve 
nonpunitive public ends of the type sought by those whose tort theories focus on utility 
maximization rather than corrective justice. Thus, the argument in this Article is perfectly 
consonant with a pluralist vision of tort law as serving many different ends. See, e.g., 
Calabresi, supra note 23; Bruce Chapman, Pluralism in Tort and Accident Law: Toward a 
Reasonable Accommodation, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 276 (Gerald J. Postema 
ed., 2001); Izhak Englard, The Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for Pluralism in 
Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra, at 183. 
126.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) 
(No. 05-1256). 
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1. The Nature of Private Wrongs 
As Judge Richard Posner has explained, “Crimes and torts frequently 
overlap. In particular, most crimes that cause definite losses to ascertainable 
victims are also torts: the crime of theft is the tort of conversion; the crime of 
assault is the tort of battery—and the crime of fraud is the tort of fraud.”127 Yet 
this overlap does not create redundancy. The tort and the crime arise from the 
same wrongful act, but they are distinct legal wrongs, invading the rights of 
separate victims.128 The tort is a private wrong to the individual victim; the 
crime is a public wrong to society. In William Blackstone’s classic formulation,  
 
private wrongs, or civil injuries, are an infringement . . . of the civil 
rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individuals; 
public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach and 
violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole community, 
considered as a community, in it’s [sic] social aggregate capacity.129 
 
If I assault someone, I simultaneously commit a private wrong against 
him—I cause him pain and humiliation and fear—and a public wrong against 
society—I disturb the peace and violate the social order. Each of those distinct 
legal wrongs is redressible in its own way, by its own victim. The wrong to 
society—the crime—can only be redressed by society’s legal representative, the 
prosecutor, in a criminal prosecution. The wrong to my individual victim—the 
tort—can only be redressed by the individual victim himself in a civil lawsuit.130 
Thus, Martin Redish and Andrew Mathews miss the mark when they 
assert that the distinction between punishment for public wrongs and 
punishment for private wrongs is “incoherent” because “[w]hen the state seeks 
to punish for public wrongs, it is usually doing so to punish and deter harms to 
private individuals.”131 It is, of course, true that public wrongs usually (though 
 
127.  United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999). 
128.  See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Merchs.’ & Mechs.’ Bank of Wheeling, 41 Pa. 42, 45 (1861) (“The 
private wrong was not merged in the public one, nor is the public prosecution intended to 
supersede the private action. Their purposes are entirely different.”). 
129.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5. 
130.  See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 4 (2000) (noting that the “purpose of 
criminal punishment is primarily to vindicate the state’s interests” whereas the “purpose of 
tort liability” is “primarily to vindicate the individual victim and the victim’s rights”). 
131.  Redish & Mathews, supra note 123, at 19 n.90. 
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not always) stem from acts that also harm private individuals. But our law 
insists that the criminal punishment—the punishment for the public wrong 
arising out of the act, as distinct from the private wrong—is punishment for 
the harm done to society, not for the harm done to the individual victim.132 
Blackstone explained that “the king, in whom centers the majesty of the whole 
community, is supposed by the law to be the person injured by every infraction 
of the public rights belonging to that community.”133 In America, the state has 
replaced the King; a crime—a public wrong—is a wrong against the state alone, 
as the representative of the community.134 Courts have insisted that “[w]e must 
remember that a criminal offense is an offense against the sovereign state, and 
not against an individual.”135 
Of course, in our common parlance, we speak of the individual as the 
“victim” of the crime, and in our casual thought we tend to think of the 
criminal law as punishing the defendant for what he did to the individual 
victim. But that impulse is misleading. In fact, the criminal law punishes the 
defendant for the harm to society that resulted from his decision to engage in 
the conduct that hurt the individual victim. 
In this regard, my theory has been criticized on the ground that “it is hard 
to accept that the criminal punishment meted out is only for the public wrong, 
not the private wrong.”136 Yet that is the law. The notion that a crime is a 
wrong to society, not to an individual, and the related notion that the criminal 
law punishes the defendant only for the wrong to society, not for the wrong 
 
132.  See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil 
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1806 (1992) (“Within the criminal paradigm, wrongful acts are 
sanctioned because they are public wrongs, violating a collective rather than an individual 
interest.”). 
133.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 129, at *2. 
134.  See, e.g., 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 418 (2008) (“[A] crime is by definition a public 
wrong, and one against all the people of the state . . . .”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (8th 
ed. 2004) (defining “criminal law” as “[t]he body of law defining offenses against the 
community at large”). 
135.  Ex parte Galbreath, 139 N.W. 1050, 1051 (N.D. 1913). This notion traces back to Cesare 
Beccaria, who insisted that “the true measure of crimes is . . . harm to society.” CESARE 
BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 24 (Richard Bellamy ed., 
Richard Davies & Virginia Cox trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1766); see also William 
F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 
13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 655 (1976) (“Beccaria took issue with the proposition that the 
primary purpose of the criminal justice system was to serve as an aid to private action in 
obtaining redress from the criminal. Since the system arose from a social contract, it should 
serve the interests of society, not the individual victim.” (footnote omitted)). The emergence 
of this conception of the criminal law is discussed further in Subsection IV.A.3. 
136.  Zipursky, supra note 7, at 144. 
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done to the individual, is not simply a meaningless legal fiction. It is 
profoundly important at both the theoretical and practical levels. 
When one person assaults or kills or rapes another, that act not only causes 
tremendous pain to the individual victim, it also makes us all feel less secure. It 
makes us afraid for our own safety. It harms the unity and the security of the 
community that we share. That is the public wrong—the wrong that is the 
business of the criminal law.137 “That additional fear confers upon crime its 
public nature and, arguably, justifies the punitive intervention of the state.”138 
The criminal law is not concerned with the private wrong to the individual 
victim.139 
To illustrate this point, consider a case like Eacret v. Holmes,140 in which the 
court denied standing to the parents of a murder victim who sought to 
preclude a governor who was morally opposed to the death penalty from 
commuting the sentence of their son’s killer. The court explained that, even 
though the parents naturally “should feel more deeply upon the subject than 
other members of the general public,” the criminal punishment was not being 
imposed for their (or their son’s) benefit any more than for the benefit of 
anyone else:  
 
Punishment for crime is not a matter of private vengeance, but of 
public policy. Any violation of constitutional rights which might be 
supposed to flow from what is asserted to be an ‘unconstitutional’ 
exercise by the executive of the pardoning power would affect equally 
all the people of the state, rather than the plaintiffs in a different and 
special way.141 
 
Another illustration of this point can be found in the black-letter rule that, 
because the crime consists of the public wrong to society, not the private wrong 
 
137.  See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 67 (1974) (distinguishing crime 
from tort on the ground that the former induces fear in the general public). 
138.  George P. Fletcher, A Transaction Theory of Crime?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 921, 925 (1985). 
139.  See id. (rejecting a theory of crime that “treats the criminal harm as the violation of a single 
person’s interest in not suffering the involuntary loss of his entitlements,” because that 
theory fails to recognize that “criminal harms are not merely private and thus limited to the 
victim, but public in their impact”); McDonald, supra note 135, at 650 (“Crime is now 
conceived of entirely in terms of an offense against society. The damage to the individual 
victim is incidental and its redress is [not] regarded as a function of the criminal justice 
process.” (footnote omitted)); see also supra notes 129-135 and accompanying text. 
140.  333 P.2d 741 (Or. 1958). 
141.  Id. at 743. 
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to the victim, it is not up the individual victim to determine whether to pursue 
(or abandon) a criminal prosecution.  
 
Because a crime is by definition a public wrong against the State, it is 
not usually an acceptable defense that the person wronged by a 
criminal has condoned the offense. Neither repayment of the victim 
nor settlement between the defendant and victim will constitute a bar 
to conviction of the offender.142  
 
This notion goes back at least as far as Cesare Beccaria, who explained that the 
“right to have someone punished does not belong to any individual; it is the 
right of all the citizens and of the sovereign. The individual can give up his part 
of this right, but he cannot cancel that of others.”143 
Indeed, a public wrong can occur even in the absence of an individual 
victim. If a person drives drunk and is fortunate enough not to cause an 
accident, she does not commit a tort; there was no individual victim of her 
dangerous conduct, and thus no private wrong. But she still commits a crime; 
her conduct has violated the social contract, made us all less secure, and 
threatened harm to society.144 
In sum, a private wrong is a tort. It is legally distinct from a public wrong—
a crime—even when both wrongs arise out of the very same act, and even when 
an individual injury stands at the heart of the crime. And when the criminal 
law punishes the public wrong (the crime), it does not punish the defendant 
for having committed the private wrong (the tort), and it does not vindicate 
any personalized interest that the individual victim might have in punishing 
the defendant that is distinct from the interest that all of society has in seeing 
the defendant punished.145 
 
142.  Pratt v. State, 307 S.E.2d 714, 716 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). 
143.  BECCARIA, supra note 135, at 75. 
144.  See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 130, § 2, at 5 (“Criminal law redresses the state’s interests in the 
security of society. It may punish conduct that threatens those interests even when no harm 
has been done. Speeding increases risks to others and so may be punished criminally. Tort 
law, aimed at protection of individuals, would never impose liability for speeding alone; tort 
law would impose liability only if harm results.”). 
145.  The traditional absence of the individual victim’s interest from the criminal law may be 
slowly eroding. The recent move toward including restitution as part of the criminal 
sentence is obviously concerned with the victim’s interests. See, e.g., United States v. 
Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that the emergence of restitution in 
American criminal law has challenged the traditional view that criminal “[o]ffenses were 
thought of as crimes against society, rather than against the individual”). But restitution is 
about compensation, not punishment. As Judge Posner has explained, including restitution 
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2. Punishment and Compensation in Criminal and Civil Law 
Our legal system draws a fundamental distinction between punishment 
and compensation. Compensation is concerned with making the victim whole, 
whereas punishment is concerned with making the perpetrator suffer.146 And 
our legal system generally proceeds from the assumption that punishment is 
the proper remedy for a public wrong, whereas compensation is the proper 
remedy for a private wrong. Prosser and Keeton give the hornbook rule: “The 
purpose of [a criminal] proceeding is to protect and vindicate the interests of 
the public as a whole, by punishing . . . . The civil action for a tort, on the other 
 
in the criminal case essentially tacks on a private tort suit to a criminal proceeding in the 
interest of judicial economy. See United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999). It 
does not necessarily reconceptualize the criminal offense as one against the individual 
victim. The broader victims’ rights movement, by contrast, does indeed represent an effort 
to reconceptualize the criminal law as engaged (at least in part) in the business of private 
vengeance—punishing the private wrong. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-
Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 689 (1999) (arguing that the victims’ rights 
movement seeks “to transform a proceeding that is supposed to be about a wrong to society 
into a proceeding about the harm to . . . individual private victims”); Doug Janicik, Note, 
Allowing Victims’ Families To View Executions: The Eighth Amendment and Society’s 
Justifications for Punishment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 935, 973 (2000) (“[S]tate legislatures, under 
the disguise of the victims’ rights movement, have endorsed a private form of 
vengeance . . . .”); id. (“While the penal system wants to ensure the criminal gets his ‘just 
deserts’ for violating the law and moral standards that define our community, the victim’s 
family wants revenge only for its injury.”). This movement has found some success in 
reforming the criminal law. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation To Resolve 
Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1248-49 (1994) (discussing the 
growth in victim-offender mediation programs); Robert C. Davis, Barbara Smith & Susan 
Hillenbrand, Restitution: The Victim’s Viewpoint, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 746, 748-50 (1992) 
(discussing the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act and the use of restitution in state 
courts); Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229, 241 
(2005) (discussing state victims’ rights amendments and statutes). But it certainly has not 
yet succeeded in changing the very nature of criminal sanctions. See Mark S. Umbreit et al., 
Restorative Justice: An Empirically Grounded Movement Facing Many Opportunities and Pitfalls, 
8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 511, 514 (2007) (noting that in our legal system, crime is still 
“viewed as having been committed against the state,” but offering restorative justice (the 
notion upon which the victims’ rights movement is based) as a “very different way of 
understanding and responding to crime” that “recognizes crime as being directed against 
individual people” rather than “viewing the state as the primary victim in criminal acts”); see 
also Jordan J. Ballor, To Reform or To Abolish? Christian Perspectives on Punishment, Prison, 
and Restorative Justice, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 481, 511 (2008) (“[A]dvocates of restorative 
justice agree that the status quo of criminal justice needs to be altered.”). 
146.  See Gail Heriot, An Essay on the Civil-Criminal Distinction with Special Reference to Punitive 
Damages, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 43, 47-48 (1996). 
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hand, is commenced and maintained by the injured person, and its primary 
purpose is to compensate for the damage suffered.”147 
Against this background, it may seem odd to suggest that punitive damages 
punish private wrongs. If private wrongs are, by definition, wrongs that call for 
compensation, not punishment, and if civil suits are, by definition, suits that 
seek compensation, not punishment, then punishment for private wrongs in a 
civil lawsuit appears to be nonsensical. 
That is, indeed, exactly what nineteenth-century critics argued. In the 
colorful words of the New Hampshire Supreme Court: 
 
How could the idea of punishment be deliberately and designedly 
installed as a doctrine of civil remedies? Is not punishment out of 
place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not to 
say absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil remedies? What 
kind of a civil remedy for the plaintiff is the punishment of the 
defendant? The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an 
unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of 
the body of the law.148 
 
Modern critics have continued to sound this theme that “[p]unitive damage 
awards corrupt the distinction between the civil and criminal law.”149 As 
Prosser and Keeton wrote, punitive damages appear “anomalous” insofar as 
“the ideas underlying the criminal law have invaded the field of torts.”150 
The problem here is more than just one of asymmetry and anomaly. It is 
one of constitutionality and procedural fairness. When the criminal courts 
punish, they do so only after providing the procedural protections of the 
criminal law. The Constitution tolerates nothing less. But when civil courts 
punish, they do so without affording any of those safeguards. Thus, the most 
fundamental of all questions surrounding punitive damages is how it can be 
constitutional for courts to administer them as punishment without criminal 
procedural safeguards. As noted above, that concern has long formed the heart 
 
147.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984) 
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. 
148.  Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873). 
149.  L.S. (Bob) Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, 
11 FORUM 57, 58 (1975). 
150.  PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 147, § 2, at 9. For a sophisticated argument that this invasion 
is theoretically unjustifiable, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract 
Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 86-93 (2003). 
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of the argument that punitive damages are unconstitutional.151 In David 
Owen’s words, the lack of criminal procedural safeguards in the assessment of 
punitive damages “assures that controversy and debate follow such 
assessments wherever they may roam, as surely as summer follows spring.”152 
This Article suggests a resolution to the controversy—one that stems from 
the distinction between punishing public and private wrongs. As a matter of 
both theory and law, there is a profound difference between the two, and that 
difference explains why criminal procedural safeguards are not necessary for 
punitive damages that punish the defendant only for the harm caused to the 
plaintiff. 
 
3. Public Retribution and Private Revenge 
To explain the theoretical difference between punishment for public 
wrongs and punishment for private wrongs, it is helpful to step back into the 
past, when there was no difference between the two. In Anglo-Saxon times, 
legal proceedings to redress wrongs were initiated by individuals, not the 
state.153 The remedies that were recoverable in those proceedings were intended 
both to punish the wrongdoer and to compensate the victim.154 They were 
revenge and compensation rolled into one.155 
The common law, however, quickly developed a sharp distinction between 
punishment and compensation. The writ of trespass (a precursor to the 
modern civil tort action) was the vehicle by which a victim could seek 
compensation. Punishment, by contrast, was achieved through the appeal of 
felony, a legal action privately initiated by the victim that was essentially 
criminal in nature.156 Through the mechanism of the latter action, the legal 
system relied primarily on the individual victim to impose punishment on the 
 
151.  See supra Part III. 
152.  David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. 
REV. 363, 366 (1994). 
153.  See Anthony J. Sebok, Introduction: What Does It Mean To Say that a Remedy Punishes?, 78 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3-4 (2003). 
154.  See id.; Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1397-1400 
(2003). 
155.  See Sherwin, supra note 154, at 1399 (noting that, in addition to being compensatory, the 
Anglo-Saxon wergeld system “served, at least in part, as a civilized substitute for violent 
revenge” and “can be viewed as entailing revenge in a more civilized form”). 
156.  See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. 
L. REV. 59, 83-86 (1996). 
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wrongdoer.157 As Lawrence Friedman explains, in England, “there was no such 
thing as a ‘district attorney,’ that is, a paid official whose job was to prosecute 
crime on behalf of the state.”158 Rather, individual victims “were supposed to 
prosecute on their own—and at their own expense.”159 For centuries in 
England, the responsibility for criminal prosecution was placed upon the 
victim, rather than the state.160 
These private criminal actions were motivated by a desire for revenge, 
rather than a desire for compensation.161 Legal historian David Seipp explains 
that medieval “[l]awyers named vengeance as the motive for bringing appeals 
of felony.”162 These actions were “instruments of vengeance.”163 Seipp notes 
that the historical sources “attest to powerful feelings of vengeance on the part 
of . . . victims,” and explains that the “motive of vengeance was more readily 
understood and accepted in the Middle Ages than it is now. The church taught 
that vengeance was a virtue and sometimes a duty.”164 Indeed, explains Seipp, 
“[i]f courts of law had not provided a means of seeking vengeance, victims 
would more readily have resorted to bloodfeuds, cycles of retaliation that 
would escalate and last for generations.”165 As the English historian J.F. 
Stephen famously declared, “The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge 
in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite.”166 
Accordingly, as crime and tort emerged as distinct branches of the common 
law, the distinction between the two initially did not turn on the identity of the 
prosecutor; both actions were privately prosecuted by the individual victim. 
Nor did it turn on whose interests were being served; both actions satisfied the 
 
157.  See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 
ARK. L. REV. 511, 515 (1994); Seipp, supra note 156, at 61-72. 
158.  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 29 (1993). 
159.  Id. at 29. 
160.  See Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
357, 359-66 (1986). 
161.  See 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 245 (photo. 
reprint 1996) (London, MacMillan & Co. 1883) (“[T]he private vengeance of the person 
wronged by a crime was the principal source to which men trusted for the administration of 
justice in early times.”); Bessler, supra note 157, at 515 (“According to . . . historians, private 
prosecutions developed in England as a means of facilitating private vengeance.”). 
162.  Seipp, supra note 156, at 63. 
163.  Id. at 78. 
164.  Id. at 63. 
165.  Id. at 63-64 
166.  JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (photo. 
reprint 2005) (London, Macmillan 1863). 
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private interests of the victim. Rather, the distinction lay in the victim’s motive 
for bringing the lawsuit and the remedy sought: “The crux of the distinction 
between crime and tort in the early common law was the choice of vengeance 
or compensation.”167 Victims who preferred compensation could bring an 
action for a writ of trespass; victims who preferred vengeance could bring an 
appeal of felony. “They could either put their wrongdoers to death and collect 
nothing [through an appeal of felony], or collect money for themselves and 
leave their wrongdoers alive with the rest of their wealth intact [through a writ 
of trespass].”168 
Gradually, over the period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, the 
primary method of prosecuting crimes shifted from criminal actions brought 
by the victims to criminal actions brought by the Crown—that is, indictments 
of felony.169 These publicly prosecuted criminal actions, unlike their privately 
prosecuted predecessors, were not designed or understood to serve the goal of 
vengeance.170 Rather, they were brought to vindicate the peace of the 
community. Seipp explains that “the king punished felons because every 
subject wanted or should want them punished. The king’s peace was their 
peace. A felon to the king was a felon to the whole kingdom. Robbery and 
fighting offended the whole community, not just the individual victim.”171 This 
was the emergence of the distinction between punishing public wrongs and 
punishing private wrongs. As the identity of the prosecutor changed, the goal 
of the criminal law changed along with it—from securing individual revenge to 
vindicating and protecting the public peace.172 Thus emerged the modern rule 
 
167.  Seipp, supra note 156, at 84. 
168.  Id. 
169.  See id. at 72-73. 
170.  See id. at 73 (“Lawyers did not describe the king’s motive for prosecuting felons as a desire 
for vengeance.”). 
171.  Id. at 74. 
172.  See also, e.g., Brown, supra note 145, at 1254-55; Davis et al., supra note 145, at 746 (“As time 
passed, a distinction was gradually drawn between offenses against the social order (crimes) 
and offenses between individuals (civil wrongs). In the former cases, the state replaced 
victims as the wronged party in criminal proceedings.”). Here in America, privately initiated 
criminal prosecutions lingered longer. See Brown, supra note 145, at 1255; William F. 
McDonald, The Role of the Victim in America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, 
RETRIBUTION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 295 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977) 
(noting that many criminal prosecutions in colonial America were perceived as redressing an 
individual injury and were privately prosecuted). Thus, during the colonial era, “criminal 
law was a combination of both public and private prosecution.” Rachel King, Why a Victims’ 
Rights Constitutional Amendment Is a Bad Idea: Practical Experiences from Crime Victims, 68 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 357, 367 (2000). And some of those privately prosecuted actions may have 
afforded the possibility of simultaneously attaining both revenge and compensation. See 
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that the victim, even if he chooses to forgive the wrongdoer, does not have the 
authority to end a criminal prosecution.173 That was the opposite of the rule 
that had governed privately initiated criminal prosecutions by appeal of felony: 
because those actions were designed to vindicate the victim’s desire for 
revenge, not the king’s peace, wrongdoers who obtained royal pardons “could 
not use them to avoid sentences of death on appeals brought by victims.”174 
Thus, by the dawn of the modern era, private vengeance had fallen out of both 
the civil law, which had by this time long been concerned with compensation 
alone,175 and the criminal law, which was now concerned with the peace of the 
public community.176 
Yet the desire for revenge burns bright in the human heart—too bright for 
the law to ignore.177 The common law thus found a new outlet for revenge: 
 
McDonald, supra note 135, at 652-53. By the early nineteenth century, however, the English 
notion that crimes are public wrongs to society, rather than private wrongs to individuals, 
had taken root in America as well, and privately initiated prosecutions fell into disuse. See 
Brown, supra note 145, at 1255. 
173.  See Seipp, supra note 156, at 78-79. 
174.  Id. at 79. 
175.  See Sherwin, supra note 154, at 1400 (“[P]rivate remedies became a vehicle for redressing 
losses . . . .”). Emily Sherwin argues that the Anglo-Saxon roots of compensatory damages 
as a stylized form of revenge are still felt in some aspects of compensatory damages 
doctrine—that “some aspects of modern compensatory remedies suggest that the law still 
provides an outlet for the impulse toward personal revenge.” Id.; see also Marc Galanter & 
David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 
1406 (1993) (noting that many plaintiffs seek compensatory damages in part “for purposes 
of vengeance, retribution, or vindication”). Be that as it may, compensatory damages are 
designed and calibrated to compensate, not to facilitate revenge. 
176.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court explained, 
In an early day in England private parties prosecuted criminal wrongs which they 
suffered. They obtained an indictment from a grand jury, and it became the duty 
and the privilege of the person injured to provide a prosecutor at his own expense 
to prosecute the indicted person. Our scheme of government has changed all this. 
It is now deemed the better public policy to provide for the public prosecution of 
public wrongs without any interference on the part of private parties, although 
they may have been injured in a private capacity different from the general public 
injury that accrues to society when a crime is committed. So under our system we 
have private prosecution for private wrongs and public prosecution for public 
wrongs. 
State v. Peterson, 218 N.W. 367, 369 (Wis. 1928). 
177.  See, e.g., ELLIS COSE, BONE TO PICK 68 (2004) (opining that the “impulse to revenge appears 
to be hardwired in humans, a result of our evolutionary development”); Kenworthey Bilz, 
The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (2007) (citing psychological and 
biological studies showing that the urge for revenge is universal, cutting across cultures, and 
indeed appears to be present even in nonhuman primates); Richard A. Posner, Retribution 
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punitive damages. It is important to note that not all private wrongs—not all 
torts—can give rise to punitive damages. Historically, punitive damages were 
allowed only for certain kinds of torts: those that violated the dignity of the 
victim by insulting or humiliating her.178 Sebok explains that, over time, the 
category of private wrongs giving rise to punitive damages expanded, but it has 
remained limited to wrongs that “express[] a lack of respect [for] the victims 
similar to that expressed by an act of insult or humiliation,” such as fraud, or a 
crass corporate decision to place profits over a known risk of harm to 
consumers.179 For wrongs such as these—where the defendant has added insult 
to injury—compensation is not enough. Victims want revenge.180 
That is what punitive damages give them. Punitive damages vindicate the 
dignity of an individual victim by allowing her to punish the defendant for 
committing a humiliating or insulting tort upon her. When full compensation 
is not enough, when the plaintiff also demands to see the defendant suffer for 
what he did to her—demands to punish him for what he did to her—she seeks 
punitive damages. Punitive damages are legally sanctioned private revenge.181 
 
and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 79 (1980) (noting the “vengeful 
component in our genetic makeup”). 
178.  See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 14-15 (1982); Sebok, supra note 78, at 1007-15. Despite Sebok’s suggestion to the 
contrary, see Sebok, supra note 78, at 1006-08, my prior work emphasized both that the 
“vindication of the dignity of the victim was the whole point of punitive damages, which, it 
will be recalled, were initially imposed only in cases involving insult or affront to the honor 
and dignity of the victim,” Colby, supra note 9, at 634-35, and that,  
properly understood in reference to their historical roots, these damages are based 
in the victim’s right to seek punishment for the private, individualized insult to her 
personal honor and dignity. That right—the interest sought to be protected by 
punitive damages—is intensely private. It would make no sense to allow a third 
party with no relationship to the victim to vindicate it. 
Id. at 651 (citations omitted); see also id. at 615, 629-37 (noting that “punitive damages were 
initially awarded exclusively in cases that involved an insult to the honor and dignity of the 
victim”). Still, Sebok skillfully develops these points well beyond what my prior work had 
done. 
179.  Sebok, supra note 78, at 1011-15. 
180.  “[T]he motivation for revenge is triggered by a transgression of the worth or dignity or 
respect of someone.” PETER A. FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF VENGEANCE 87 (2001). 
181.  On this fundamental point, I am in agreement with Sebok and Zipursky. See Sebok, supra 
note 78; Zipursky, supra note 7, at 154 (noting that there is a “quality of vengefulness to 
punitive damages”). Other commentators have also made this observation in passing. See, 
e.g., Owen, supra note 152, at 375 (referring to punitive damages as a “kind of private 
revenge”); Sherwin, supra note 154, at 1402 (suggesting that punitive damages are a form of 
“private punishment” that serve the goal of private revenge); Note, Exemplary Damages in 
the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 521 (1957) (“Many plaintiffs seeking exemplary 
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Once we understand that fact, it is worth inquiring whether “punitive” 
damages are misnamed. Is the satisfaction of private revenge really a form of 
punishment? One could argue that it is not. “Getting even” is, after all, a 
metaphor of compensation. Following the reasoning of Jean Hampton, one 
could posit that a victim who suffers insult—in Hampton’s terminology “moral 
injury”—has been “diminished” by the wrongdoer who fails to recognize and 
respect the victim as a person of equal moral worth.182 The victim thus 
demands vindication: she wants her moral worth “repaired” by forcing the 
defendant to suffer a loss that reequalizes their moral statuses.183 In this 
respect, punitive damages ensure that the victim is made whole again not only 
financially, medically, and emotionally (which is where compensatory damages 
stop), but also morally. The only way to make the victim truly whole is to 
allow her to punish the defendant. Only then has her moral status—her 
honor—been reestablished. To Hampton, this “is actually a form of 
compensation to the victim.”184 
Perhaps it is. But even so, it is also punishment.185 If the only way to 
achieve full compensation is to allow the plaintiff to impose punishment, then 
it is difficult to deny that the additional remedy is punitive, even if it is also in 
some nontraditional sense “compensatory.” It is a familiar refrain of punitive 
damages law that punitive damages are designed to go further then mere 
compensation for insult or humiliation. “Such damages,” say the hornbooks, 
“are given to the plaintiff over and above the full compensation for the injuries, 
 
damages are motivated to some extent by a desire to revenge themselves on the 
defendant.”). 
182.  Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 1659, 1666, 1677 (1992). 
183.  Id. at 1686-87. For an excellent discussion of vengeance as a form of equalization of honor in 
primitive societies, see WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE (2006). 
184.  Hampton, supra note 182, at 1698; see also Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1432-33; 
Owen, supra note 152, at 378; Sebok, supra note 78, at 1019-20. 
185.  See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 189 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(observing that “naked vengeance” is “‘punishment’ in the purest sense”); LEO ZAIBERT, 
PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 69-95 (2006) (articulating a detailed philosophical 
argument that revenge is a kind of punishment). Of course, one could invest a great deal of 
energy wrestling with epistemological questions about the nature of punishment, but I am 
inclined to agree with Marc Galanter and David Luban that it suffices for these purposes to 
define punishment as simply the “deliberate imposition of a harm, injury, deprivation, or 
other bad thing on someone on the ground of the commission of some offense.” Galanter & 
Luban, supra note 175, at 1397; cf. H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, 
60 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 4 (1959) (defining punishment as the imposition by the 
legal system of unpleasant consequences upon an offender for an offense against legal rules). 
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for the purpose of punishing the defendant.”186 As Arthur Ripstein explains, 
“Although the victim suffered an additional dignitary loss, and the punitive 
damages serve to address that loss, their purpose is not to compensate for it. 
Indeed, their point is precisely that the dignitary loss is not compensable. They 
serve instead to vindicate the right.”187 
Punitive damages are indeed punishment. But despite the Supreme Court’s 
ill-considered dicta to the contrary,188 they are a type of punishment that serves 
an entirely different goal from the one served by the criminal law.189 The 
punishment of public wrongs through the criminal law is a world apart from 
the punishment of private wrongs through punitive damages.190 
Because it is seeking to vindicate a different wrong, the state, acting on 
behalf of society, has an interest in punishment that differs from that of the 
individual victim. The state’s interest might be seen as deterrence—if it fails to 
punish the offender, it encourages him to act again and others to follow in his 
footsteps, placing us all at greater risk in the future. The state’s interest might 
also be seen as retribution. Public retribution is typically conceived of in two 
competing ways: as a mechanism for preserving equal liberty, and as a system 
of ensuring just deserts. 
The former vision, as Dan Markel explains, conceives of retribution by the 
state as effectuating society’s commitment to equal liberty. By committing a 
criminal act, an offender effectively signals that he believes he has greater 
liberty than his fellow citizens—those whom he victimizes for his own gain.191 
“[T]he offense is an active rebellion against the political order of equal liberty 
 
186.  PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 147, § 2, at 9. 
187.  ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 151 (1999). Sebok explains that 
“[v]indication is obviously not the same thing as compensation, although one could imagine 
how, under certain circumstances, the act of vindication might provide, at the same time, 
compensation for feelings wounded through insult.” Sebok, supra note 99, at 200.  
188.  See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (declaring 
that punitive damages “serve the same purposes as criminal penalties”). 
189.  See Geistfeld, supra note 23, at 1099 (“Retribution and deterrence can have different 
meanings in tort law and criminal law, contrary to the Court’s assumption that these two 
purposes are shared by the two bodies of law.”). 
190.  Cf. Sebok, supra note 78, at 1017 (articulating “two kinds of punishment: retribution in 
public law and revenge in private law”). Zipursky makes a similar point when he argues that 
“it is the plaintiff’s right to be punitive, not the system’s need to punish the defendant, that 
explains the special status of punitive damages within American tort law.” Zipursky, supra 
note 7, at 107. The plaintiff’s right to be punitive is the private right to seek revenge. The 
system’s need to punish the defendant is the public interest in retribution. 
191.  See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row 
and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 430-31 (2005). 
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under law.”192 By punishing him, the state is vindicating society’s collective 
interest in restoring and reinforcing the social order. 
The competing vision of retribution in the criminal law is based not on the 
notion that society must vindicate the rule of law and equal liberty, but rather 
on the principle of just deserts: society has a moral obligation to punish 
culpable wrongdoers to the extent of their desert.193 As John Rawls explains, 
“It is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion 
to his wrong doing. . . . [A]nd the severity of the appropriate punishment 
depends on the depravity of his act.”194 
Under either view of the nature and role of public retribution, it is clear 
that the retribution that the government seeks for the public wrong is 
conceptually distinct from the retribution that the individual victim seeks for 
the private wrong—revenge.195 “Formal retributive punishment,” explains 
Emily Sherwin, “is inflicted in the name of the community for transgressions 
of its common standards. . . . In contrast . . . revenge is based on personal 
grievance arising from an injury to the avenger or someone close to him.”196 
Robert Nozick has carefully distinguished public retribution from private 
revenge. Nozick’s distinction is based on several characteristics, including: 
 
 
192.  Id. at 433. 
193.  See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91, 
153-54 (1997). 
194.  John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4-5 (1955). 
195.  “[R]evenge is personal retribution.” CHARLES K.B. BARTON, GETTING EVEN: REVENGE AS A 
FORM OF JUSTICE 12 (1999). It differs from public retribution, whether the latter concept is 
understood as the imposition of just deserts, see, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN 17 
(2003) (distinguishing revenge from a retribution of just deserts on the ground that “[t]he 
goal of vengeance is simply to provide vindictive satisfaction to victims, and victims may 
require for their satisfaction something other than . . . what wrongdoers deserve”), or as a 
guarantor of equal liberty, see Markel, supra note 191, at 437-40 (explaining how an equal 
liberty vision of “retributive justice might usefully be contrasted with revenge”); see also 
G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 220, at 252 (Allen W. Wood ed., 
1991) (arguing that revenge vindicates the victim’s private interest, whereas a criminal 
prosecution vindicates the public’s universal interest in justice). 
196.  Sherwin, supra note 154, at 1409; see also FRENCH, supra note 180, at 67-68 (noting that 
revenge, unlike retribution, is personal); Posner, supra note 177, at 72 (“While retribution 
focuses on the criminal’s wrong, [revenge] focuses on the impulse of the victim (or of those 
who sympathize with him) to strike back at the criminal.”). But see OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 45 (photo. reprint 2008) (1881) (arguing that retribution is 
simply “vengeance in disguise”); SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE 4 (1983) (arguing that 
“retribution” is “a word that affords the comfort of euphemism although it is virtually 
synonymous with ‘revenge’”). 
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Retribution sets an internal limit to the amount of the punishment, 
according to the seriousness of the wrong, whereas revenge internally 
need set no limit to what is inflicted. . . . 
   . . . Revenge is personal . . . [w]hereas the agent of retribution 
need have no special or personal tie to the victim of the wrong for 
which he exacts retribution. . . . 
. . . . 
    . . . Revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in the 
suffering of another, while retribution either need involve no 
emotional tone, or involves another one, namely, pleasure at justice 
being done. . . . 
. . . . 
   . . . There need be no generality in revenge . . . [w]hereas the 
imposer of retribution, inflicting deserved punishment for a wrong, is 
committed to general principles mandating punishment in other 
similar circumstances.197  
 
Criminal law theorists have generally focused on the importance of keeping 
revenge out of the criminal law.198 No civilized government employs its 
 
197.  ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 367-68 (1981). To this list, Markel adds 
that retribution, unlike revenge, necessarily depends on the use of the power of the state and 
concerns itself with the moral autonomy, dignity, and rehabilitation of the offender. See 
Markel, supra note 191, at 438. 
198.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY SCARRE, AFTER EVIL: RESPONDING TO WRONGDOING 115 (2004) (noting 
that most “retributivist thinkers . . . have wished to disconnect as fully as possible the 
notions of justice and revenge”); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the 
Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (2005) (rejecting “revenge as an appropriate 
justification for punishment in a liberal democracy”); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of 
Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 994 (1985) (noting that “retaliation has received 
relatively little support from philosophers or social scientists”). One occasionally sees 
references to an outlier theory of retribution in the criminal law that sounds in notions of 
“revenge.” But the use of the label “revenge” in this context is misleading. This theory sees 
criminal punishment as vindicating a very different interest from the one served by punitive 
damages as punishment for private wrongs. One version of this theory views the criminal 
law as achieving revenge on behalf of society for the public wrong visited upon society. See 
Henderson, supra, at 991 (noting that even if criminal retribution is viewed as revenge, 
rather than moral desert, it is societal revenge, because “[s]ociety has a right to retaliate 
against those who have hurt it or failed to follow its rules”); Sherwin, supra note 154, at 1409 
n.93 (noting that “even formal retribution may involve collective revenge for an act that 
harms society as a whole”). If the criminal law plays that role, it still redresses a collective, 
societal wrong, rather than an individual, private wrong.  
   A related version of this theory focuses on the impulse that we all have to get back at 
the perpetrator of a particularly brutal crime, even if we have no personal connection to the 
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prosecutorial authority to help its citizens to extract a pound of flesh from 
those who have wronged them. As George Fletcher puts it, criminal 
punishment must not be about vengeance, but rather “must maintain its public 
character. It is not purely a private institution. It is imposed in the name of the 
People or State against actions that threaten the well-being of the entire 
society.”199 
Punitive damages, on the other hand, are all about private vengeance. They 
are an entirely different animal.200 For this reason, I respectfully but forcefully 
disagree with the claim of Redish and Mathews that “the concept of a distinct 
category of ‘private’ punishment for ‘private’ wrongs is, at its foundation, 
incoherent.”201 Criminal punishments and punitive damages are neither 
 
victim. See Bilz, supra note 177, at 1071 (citing scientific studies demonstrating that “people 
derive satisfaction not only from foiling and avenging wrongs against themselves but foiling 
and avenging wrongdoing generally”). If criminal punishment is understood to satisfy that 
impulse, then it could be seen as redressing wrongs to individuals, not wrongs to society. 
But it still does so on behalf of the public, not the victim; it still vindicates the collective 
interest of the community in avenging the wrong, not the private, personal interest of the 
victim. See Fellmeth, supra, at 23 (“[T]he fundamental value that the legal system promotes 
under the revenge motive [for criminal punishment] . . . is the psychological gratification of 
the public.”); cf. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 948 (arguing in utilitarian terms that 
“the punishment objective derives ultimately from the pleasure or satisfaction people obtain 
from seeing blameworthy parties punished”). Even if one articulates this as an “individual 
vengeance rationale for criminal punishment,” Paul Boudreaux, Booth v. Maryland and the 
Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 177, 
178 (1989) (emphasis added) (calling for “an individual-oriented ‘vengeance’ rationale for 
criminal punishment, based on the observed visceral satisfaction felt by individuals in society 
as the result of seeing a criminal punished for his crime”), it is premised on “[a]ggregated 
individual vengeance”—the collective vengeance of all of the individuals in society, rather 
than the vengeance of the victim alone—as the justification for the criminal law, see id. It 
does not seek to use the criminal law to vindicate the unique and personal interest of the 
victim. As such, it is not truly revenge. The natural impulse to avenge wrongs to others is 
best labeled as “vigilantism,” rather than “vengeance” or “revenge.” BARTON, supra note 195, 
at 79. Revenge, as Nozick observed, is personal; it is not the business of the criminal law. 
199.  GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 39 (1998); see also FRENCH, supra 
note 180, at 68 (“The state does not punish the criminal for the sake of revenge, though it 
can, depending on the penal theory one adopts, punish for the sake of retribution.”). 
200.  David Owen has recognized the distinction between private revenge and public retribution, 
but he concludes (wrongly, in my opinion) that punitive damages do and should serve to 
advance both interests. See Owen, supra note 152, at 375-77. 
201.  Redish & Mathews, supra note 123, at 19 n.90. In this same vein, I reject Zipursky’s 
characterization of my view as based on the idea that “punitive damages [are] punishment 
in the same sense as criminal punishment, only attached to a more narrowly defined act (a 
‘private wrong’).” Zipursky, supra note 7, at 158. It is not the “act” that distinguishes 
criminal and civil punishment; to the contrary, the same “act” often leads to both types of 
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redundant nor indistinguishable, even if they are both imposed as a 
consequence of the same wrongful act. They are distinct punishments for 
distinct legal wrongs serving distinct punitive goals. 
 
B. The Desirability of Punishing Private Wrongs 
But is private revenge a legitimate goal in our legal system? To be sure, 
revenge is a ubiquitous theme in popular culture, most visibly in western and 
action hero movies.202 We, the viewers, find ourselves rooting for the wronged 
character seeking revenge, and we celebrate when he finally achieves it at the 
end—the colder served the better. We crave revenge in our hearts. But our 
pleasure is a guilty one; in our heads, we tend to view revenge as unhealthy 
and primitive.203 And thus we tend to believe that revenge should be purged 
from a legal system that cherishes reason over passion.204 As Francis Bacon 
long ago exclaimed, “Revenge is a kind of wild justice; which the more man’s 
nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out.”205 
We have a good reason for that impulse: “revenge as a motive for action 
has no necessary connection with justice.”206 The avenger does not necessarily 
 
punishment. The distinction is based, rather, on the legal wrong being punished and the 
goal of the punishment. 
202.  See, e.g., FRENCH, supra note 180, at 3-64.  
203.  See, e.g., BARTON, supra note 195, at xiv (“Especially in contemporary Western societies, 
revenge is widely thought of as being crazy, nasty, and unworthy of the aspirations of truly 
civilized people, or of a civilized society. . . . Seeking justice is all very well, but it is far from 
acceptable for anyone to admit that the justice they claim to seek may in fact add up to 
revenge.”); JACOBY, supra note 196, at 12 (noting that the “contemporary psychiatric 
approach to the question of revenge” is that “the urge to retaliate may be universal but it is 
unhealthy” and thus people should give it up and rely instead on the detached retribution of 
the criminal process). 
204.  See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 298 (1970) (suggesting that the 
notion that “the victim—or his family—has the right to see that retribution is exacted . . . 
smacks . . . of revenge,” which is a “not very healthy urge to get even”); Bruce Chapman & 
Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 
741, 787 (1989) (“Retribution must not be replaced by privately motivated revenge . . . .”); 
Note, supra note 181, at 522 (“A modern legal system can hardly be based on revenge . . . .”). 
Leah Mervine observes that the word “vengeance” does not even appear in Black’s Law 
Dictionary. Leah R. Mervine, Comment, Bridging the “Philosophical Void” in Punitive 
Damages: Empowering Plaintiffs and Society Through Curative Damages, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1587, 
1627 n.250 (2007). Nor does “revenge.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 134. 
205.  Francis Bacon, Of Revenge, reprinted in 6 COLLECTED WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON pt. 2, at 384 
(Routledge/Thoemmes Press 1996) (1625). 
206.  SCARRE, supra note 198, at 101. 
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care whether the punishment fits the crime.207 Nor does he necessarily care 
whether like cases are treated alike.208 Nor is he likely to provide his target with 
a fair opportunity to explain himself—to establish his innocence, to present 
evidence of mitigating circumstances, or the like. Vengeance cares not for 
justice. As such, it seems incompatible with law. 
But these problems with revenge are tied to its extralegality.209 If we 
control revenge through the legal system—through the mechanism of judicially 
constrained punitive damages—we can ensure that it is achieved in a way that 
is consistent with, not defiant of, law and justice. We can ensure that the 
punishment fits the offense, that like cases are treated alike, and that the 
accused is treated fairly.210 
In fact, allowing controlled revenge affirmatively serves the goal of justice. 
Given the powerful, instinctive human impulse for revenge, affording a legal 
outlet for revenge within the framework of justice helps to prevent victims 
from seeking revenge outside of the framework of justice. As Holmes noted, 
because “people would gratify the passion of revenge outside of the law, if the 
law did not help them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving itself, 
and thus avoid the greater evil of private retribution.”211 Indeed, one of the 
earliest justifications for punitive damages offered by the courts was that their 
availability would deter insulted victims from seeking private revenge outside 
of the law.212 
 
207.  See HEGEL, supra note 195, § 102, at 130; NOZICK, supra note 197, at 367; Fellmeth, supra note 
198, at 25; Posner, supra note 177, at 82 (noting “a serious deficiency in a simple vengeance 
approach to punishment”—that “[t]here is nothing in the concept of vengeance . . . that 
suggests a limitation on the magnitude of retaliation”). 
208.  See NOZICK, supra note 197, at 368. 
209.  See BARTON, supra note 195, at 42 (“[J]ust like any other kind of punishment, retribution, 
including personal retribution, which is revenge, can be just or unjust depending on 
whether the principles of justice, such as proportionality and not punishing the innocent, 
are observed or violated.”). 
210.  See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 195, at 20 (discussing Aeschylus’s Oresteia trilogy, in which the 
impulse for private revenge outside of the law is productively transformed into “the pursuit 
of revenge under the constraints of law”). 
211.  HOLMES, supra note 196, at 41-42; see also, e.g., COSE, supra note 177, at 73; Owen, supra note 
152, at 375. 
212.  See, e.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553, 554 (1872); Merest v. Harvey, (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 
761, 761 (C.P.) (Heath, J.) (“It goes to prevent the practice of duelling, if juries are 
permitted to punish insult by exemplary damages.”). 
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What is more, even beyond its ability to stave off extralegal private revenge, 
there is much to be said for allowing private revenge within the law.213 That is 
to say, revenge is not simply an unavoidable evil that is at least less odious 
when cabined within the law; it in fact serves a legitimate interest that the law 
might actively pursue. Allowing punitive damages as punishment for private 
wrongs vindicates the dignity of the victim.214 Sebok explains that when a 
tortfeasor has committed a wrong that insults the victim’s dignity, “the 
defendant violated at least two rights: The primary private right (to physical 
security, property, etc.) and the right to be treated as someone deserving to 
have those primary private rights respected by others.”215 Compensatory 
damages redress the violation of the first right, but not the second one. The 
criminal law, which is concerned only with the interests of society, redresses 
neither.216 The violation of the second right can be redressed only through 
punitive damages, which allow the victim to equalize her moral status with that 
of her aggressor.217 Marc Galanter and David Luban refer to this feature of 
punitive damages as “expressive defeat”—a public announcement of moral 
equality to counteract the message of inferiority that the tortfeasor sent to, and 
about, the victim by humiliating her without regard to her honor or her right 
 
213.  This point has been made by a number of theorists who seek a greater role for revenge in the 
criminal law. See, e.g., BARTON, supra note 195, at xvi (arguing that, “far from revenge being 
an alternative to justice, when implemented with appropriate legal and institutional 
constraints, revenge is a perfectly legitimate and sometimes superior form of justice”); 
FRENCH, supra note 180, at 112-229 (articulating a detailed philosophical argument that 
revenge is morally legitimate—indeed, virtuous—so long as it meets the conditions of being 
pursued by an appropriate person, being imposed upon a person who deserves it, and being 
proportional to the offense); Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the 
Victim’s Desire for Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1115, 1119 
(2004) (“[I]t is not immoral for a victim to want to punish his offender so as to cause his 
offender to suffer; and that punishment which causes suffering is also just, so long as it is 
inflicted upon the party guilty of the offense, and is proportional to the level of harm 
suffered by the victim.”). 
214.  See Colby, supra note 9, at 634; cf. Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: II, 
43 COLUM. L. REV. 967, 977 (1943) (explaining that, unlike a criminal punishment, a 
punitive damages award “is an authoritative vindication of the injured person’s rights”). 
215.  Sebok, supra note 78, at 1014. 
216.  But see RIPSTEIN, supra note 187, at 148 (arguing that criminal punishment redresses the 
second right). 
217.  See Hampton, supra note 182, at 1686-87. Thus, Roscoe Pound once remarked that punitive 
damages were appropriate because the defendant “acted as if the [plaintiff] had no right to 
be considered.” Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus & 
Mary, 186 N.E. 798, 799 (N.Y. 1933). 
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to be treated as a morally worthy human being in possession of rights that are 
entitled to respect.218 
Revenge thus has value, so long as it takes place within the confines of the 
law. Still, given the existence of the criminal law, it is worth asking whether 
punitive damages are necessary to gain the benefits of revenge. Yes, the 
criminal law technically vindicates society’s interests, rather than the individual 
victim’s,219 but most victims do not know that. In an important recent article, 
Kenworthey Bilz observes that victims often view the criminal law as serving 
the goal of equalizing their social standing and moral worth with that of the 
offender.220 That is to say, victims are willing to “delegate” their revenge to the 
criminal prosecutor.221 
If that is so, then perhaps there is no need for punitive damages.222 I am 
inclined to disagree, however, for two reasons. First, the law cannot have it 
both ways. The law cannot simultaneously defend retributive criminal justice 
against charges that it is nothing more than glorified revenge223 on the ground 
that it in fact serves a very different purpose, while at the same time dismissing 
the need for punitive damages on the ground that the criminal law adequately 
serves the purpose of facilitating revenge. 
Second, as a functional matter, the criminal law often does not adequately 
substitute for private revenge. Bilz notes many circumstances in which victims 
are not willing to delegate their revenge to the state, or are not satisfied with 
the results when they do.224 In fact, explains Bilz, victims are least willing to 
step aside in favor of the state when they are the victims of crimes in which 
their honor has been besmirched.225 Yet those are precisely the wrongs that call 
 
218.  See Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1432-38. Galanter and Luban appear to view 
punitive damages as serving both the individual interest in equalizing moral status through 
expressive defeat and the public interest in public retribution. On my theory, they are half 
right. 
219.  See, e.g., Ex parte Galbreath, 139 N.W. 1050, 1051 (N.D. 1913) (explaining that it is the 
“sovereign state . . . whose dignity, alone, is sought to be vindicated” by the criminal law). 
220.  Bilz, supra note 177, at 1088-90. 
221.  See id. at 1063-64. 
222.  See Ellis, supra note 178, at 29 (noting that punitive damages may be unnecessary to placate 
“the victim’s desire for vindication or vengeance” because the criminal law provides an 
alternative). 
223.  See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(“Punishment as retribution has been condemned by scholars for centuries, and the Eighth 
Amendment itself was adopted to prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with 
vengeance.” (citations omitted)). 
224.  Bilz, supra note 177, at 1100-11. 
225.  Id. at 1100-05. 
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for punitive damages.226 In addition, because regulatory agencies and 
prosecutors are subject to capture and governmental prosecutorial resources are 
limited, the criminal law will often fail to go after wrongdoers, especially the 
rich and the well-connected.227 And often, even when it does go forward with a 
criminal prosecution, the government will fail to obtain a conviction, thus 
leaving the victim unsatisfied.228 The entire modern victims’ rights movement 
is fueled by the reality that victims are routinely left unsatisfied by the criminal 
process, particularly by their inability to play a central, decision-making role in 
the quest for punishment; their desire for revenge, or at least for a fair shot at 
pursuing revenge within the confines of the law, is not met.229 
 
C. Constitutionality: Private Revenge and Criminal Procedure 
When properly circumscribed, punitive damages are thus a desirable 
feature of our legal system. But are they constitutional? Benjamin Zipursky 
notes that punitive damages present something of a “constitutional puzzle”: 
“[I]n a legal system that regularly cautions against elevating form over 
substance, it is peculiar that there has been near-immunity [from 
constitutional scrutiny] for what are openly labeled forms of ‘punishment.’”230 
That puzzle deepens when we recognize that the prevailing judicial 
understanding of punitive damages in recent years has been Justice Stevens’s 
view of punitive damages as punishment for public wrongs. The Supreme 
Court has expressed “concerns” with the risk of unfairness that arises as a 
result of the fact that “defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases 
have not been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding.”231 
And it has cautioned that “[g]reat care must be taken to avoid use of the civil 
 
226.  See supra notes 178-179 and accompanying text. 
227.  See Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 53-58, on file with author), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=991865. 
228.  Of course, punitive damages plaintiffs are often unsuccessful too, and thus fail to obtain the 
revenge they seek. But at least they have the satisfaction of being given the opportunity to 
pursue their revenge in a legal action initiated and controlled by them. Cf. Christopher J. 
Robinette, Peace: A Public Purpose for Punitive Damages?, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 327, 337-38 
(2008) (noting that punitive damages are uniquely able to quell the victim’s desire for 
revenge because of their personal nature—because the victim is empowered to bring and 
control the action). 
229.  See Eisenstat, supra note 213, at 1144. 
230.  Zipursky, supra note 7, at 106. 
231.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003). 
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process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the 
heightened protections of a criminal trial have been observed, including, of 
course, its higher standards of proof.”232 “Punitive damages,” it insists, “are not 
a substitute for the criminal process.”233 But if they “serve the same purposes as 
criminal penalties,”234 then how are they not simply a “substitute for the 
criminal process?” The Court has never answered that question. 
Seeking to develop a sophisticated account of the concept of punitive 
damages as punishment for public wrongs, Dan Markel articulates and defends 
a vision of punitive damages as vindicating the public interest in precisely the 
same way that the criminal law does.235 Explicitly distinguishing them from 
revenge,236 he views punitive damages as “a scheme of retributive justice 
committed to condemning misconduct in the public’s name, rather than the 
victim’s.”237 He thus describes punitive damages as the state’s “outsourcing” of 
its prosecuting function to private parties.238 Punitive damages, he claims, 
“allow[] private parties to vindicate the kinds of wrongs the criminal system 
might, in a fully-funded world, pursue.”239 
But Markel’s proposition would seem to make punitive damages a 
“substitute for the criminal process.”240 Is it really that easy to get around the 
Constitution’s mandate of heightened procedural safeguards in criminal 
cases?241 The Supreme Court has observed that “[t]hose who wrote our 
Constitution . . . intended to safeguard the people of this country from 
 
232.  Id. at 428. 
233.  Id. 
234.  Id. at 417. 
235.  Markel, supra note 227, at 48, 60. To Markel, punitive damages serve the “public’s interest in 
retributive justice.” Id. at 6. 
236.  Id. at 24-25. 
237.  Id. at 48. 
238.  Id. at 65. 
239.  Id. at 61; see also In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that 
punitive damages “awards act almost as a form of criminal penalty administered in a civil 
court at the request of a plaintiff who serves somewhat as a private attorney general”); 
Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1445; Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism 
Derailed by the Court that Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 528-31 
(2005). 
240.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003). 
241.  Markel views punitive damages as an “intermediate sanction,” necessitating greater 
procedural protections than compensatory damages, but fewer than criminal penalties. See 
Markel, supra note 227, at 11 n.48. He plans to address constitutional concerns in an 
upcoming work. See id. at 8 n.20, 67 (citing Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages 
Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)). 
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punishment . . . unless certain tested safeguards were observed,” such as the 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the right to be free from double jeopardy.242 If the 
government can simply “outsource” its prosecuting function to private 
individuals who are not constrained by those procedural safeguards, then the 
Bill of Rights becomes a largely optional constraint—one that the government 
can easily, and would often gladly, circumvent.243 Indeed, Galanter and Luban 
profess that one advantage of punitive damages over criminal punishment is 
that the lower standard of proof in civil trials ensures that more defendants will 
lose their cases.244 
Again, how can that be constitutional? Zipursky’s answer appears to be that 
punitive damages have a “double aspect”: they simultaneously play the civil, 
private law role of affording the victim a private “right to be punitive,” and the 
criminal, public law role of satisfying the public’s need for retribution and 
deterrence.245 That is to say, punitive damages are simultaneously punishment 
for both public and private wrongs. Zipursky argues that if the private aspect 
of punitive damages were to be abandoned, then they would become 
unconstitutional. But so long as a punitive damages award is in some 
amorphous way tied to the civil aspect of the private right to be punitive, it is 
constitutional for the jury to impose punishment that is also based on the 
criminal aspect of public retribution and deterrence; the fact that punitive 
damages are self-consciously serving criminal goals is constitutionally 
acceptable so long as they are also serving civil goals.246 
That conclusion is hard to accept. If our concern is with sanctions that 
serve criminal law goals without criminal procedural safeguards, then the fact 
that punitive damages also serve the individual’s interest in being punitive—in 
private revenge—should hardly matter. The death penalty also serves the 
victim’s family’s interest in exacting private revenge, but that does not mean 
that it can be imposed on behalf of society without regard to the constraints 
demanded by the Bill of Rights.247 
 
242.  United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 (1946). 
243.  See Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 204, at 804-05 (arguing that, if the government 
“contracts out” its prosecutorial function to private parties through punitive damages, then 
criminal procedural protections should be provided). 
244.  See Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1443. 
245.  Zipursky, supra note 7, at 155-59. 
246.  See id. at 155-56, 164-65, 168. 
247.  Sebok criticizes Zipursky along similar lines. See Sebok, supra note 78, at 1027. 
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Zipursky attempts to ameliorate this objection by stating that a punitive 
damages award that is larger than what “a reasonable juror could have 
concluded the plaintiff was entitled to in light of the wrong the defendant did 
to her,” or that otherwise cannot be “properly regarded as reflecting a 
judgment about the plaintiff’s right to be punitive,” is unconstitutional for 
failure to provide criminal procedural safeguards.248 That suggests that, at the 
end of the day, the punitive damages award must be defensible solely as a 
punishment for the private wrong; if it can be defended only by reference to its 
criminal aspect, then it is unconstitutional.249 Still, Zipursky’s account suggests 
that it is permissible to instruct the jury on the basis of the criminal aspect of 
punitive damages, so long as the size of the verdict can ultimately be defended 
as a civil punishment. Williams essentially rejects that assertion—that it is 
constitutional to instruct the jury that it can punish for the harm done to 
society, so long as, ultimately, the size of the punitive award would be 
defensible as punishment only for the harm done to the plaintiff—and for good 
reason. The claim that punitive damages have a “double aspect” is an insightful 
descriptive account of the Court’s schizophrenic jurisprudence, but it is not a 
constitutional defense of it. If punitive damages possess a “criminal aspect”—if 
the legal system seeks to use them to pursue the goals of the criminal law—
then their constitutionality remains suspect regardless of whether they also 
have a “civil aspect.” 
So we must return once again to the fundamental question: How is it 
constitutional to punish a defendant in the absence of criminal procedural 
protections? The answer, I believe, is that it is not—unless the punishment is 
meted out solely for the private wrong, not the public one. Substantiating that 
assertion necessitates at least a brief exploration of the notoriously murky 
boundary between the civil and the criminal law. Any foray into this territory is 
bound to be unsatisfying. As one commentator has explained, “Despite this 
importance, the Court’s numerous decisions in the area have amounted to an 
incoherent muddle. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to identify an area of 
constitutional law that betrays a greater conceptual incoherence.”250 Still, I 
 
248.  Zipursky, supra note 7, at 168 (emphasis omitted). 
249.  In this regard, Zipursky seems at times to reject the legitimacy of the very “double aspect” of 
punitive damages that he describes. If an award of punitive damages is unconstitutional if it 
goes beyond the civil aspect to the criminal one, then it would seem that only the civil aspect 
is permissible. See id. at 107 (“Insofar as punitive damages are basically civil, and not about 
criminal punishment, they do not merit the special constitutional scrutiny afforded to 
criminal defendants. Insofar as they are criminal, they do merit such scrutiny.”). 
250.  Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1261, 1268 (1998); see also Fellmeth, supra note 198, at 9-10 (describing the Court’s 
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believe that enough of an answer can be teased from the doctrinal and 
conceptual morass. 
Over the years, commentators and courts have offered numerous proposals 
for delineating the boundary between civil and criminal law. This is not the 
place to recount and analyze them all. Suffice it to say that no proposal is 
obviously correct, and indeed it may well be that there is no perfect answer to 
be found. Perhaps there is less of a clear line than a spectrum, from the wholly 
civil on one side, through a sliding scale of hybrid actions, to the wholly 
criminal on the other. In fact, much of the current debate rages over the 
question of whether there is or should be a set of “middle ground” sanctions 
that are neither completely civil nor completely criminal in nature.251 
I take no position here on that question. I seek only to offer a sensible 
understanding of the ultimate line across which lies the purely criminal law, 
and thus the crossing of which necessitates the provision of criminal procedural 
safeguards. And I seek to offer a sensible explanation of how it is that punitive 
damages can be said not to cross that line. 
This explanation is one that existing proposals have trouble providing. 
Consider two of the most promising possibilities. First, Galanter and Luban 
argue that a sanction can be criminal only if the prosecuting party is the state, 
rather than a private individual.252 That line might explain why punitive 
damages do not warrant criminal procedural protections. But it is conceptually 
problematic, especially when it comes to punitive damages. Galanter and 
Luban defend their line on the ground that the Bill of Rights is premised on 
the “fear [of] the power of the state . . . . to eliminate its political enemies,” and 
they assert that “these special concerns do not really implicate punitive 
damages.”253 The conclusion, however, does not follow from the premise. 
Zipursky explains, 
 
Galanter and Luban treat private plaintiffs as those to whom the state 
has delegated enforcement power—in effect, as private attorneys 
 
decisions in this area as “nothing less than a jurisprudential Frankenstein’s monster,” and 
“as incoherent as any in the Court’s jurisprudence”). 
251.  Compare Mann, supra note 132 (arguing for the explicit recognition of middle ground 
sanctions), with Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the 
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997) (arguing against intermediate 
sanctions). 
252.  See Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1456. 
253.  Id. at 1457; see also Klein, supra note 145, at 691 (arguing that punitive damages fall on the 
civil side of the line because “the framers wished to protect individuals from the 
government, not from private parties and juries of their peers”). 
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general. The problem with this is it undercuts the idea that 
constitutional norms should not apply. If the private plaintiffs are 
really delegees of state power, then the awesome power of the state is 
being used, albeit in a decentralized way.254 
 
Second, Henry Hart argues that “[w]hat distinguishes a criminal from a 
civil sanction and all that distinguishes it . . . is the judgment of community 
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”255 A criminal 
sanction is “a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation 
of the community.”256 Employing this distinction, commentators have argued 
that punitive damages are civil and do not necessitate the safeguards of 
criminal procedure because they do not impose the stigma of moral 
condemnation that accompanies a criminal penalty.257 Regardless of whether 
this is a sensible line, however, it would seem that punitive damages actually 
fall on the criminal side of it. After all, the Supreme Court itself has declared 
that a “jury’s . . . imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral 
condemnation.”258 
An alternative ultimate line between the criminal and the civil law—one 
that offers a solution to the “constitutional puzzle” of punitive damages—is 
that, to be criminal, a sanction must be punishment for a public wrong. This is 
essentially a two-part test. The sanction must both be punishment and be 
intended to redress a wrong to society. 
 
254.  Zipursky, supra note 7, at 146 (citation omitted); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 572 n.17 (1996) (“State power may be exercised as much by a jury’s application of a 
state rule of law in a civil lawsuit as by a statute.” (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 265 (1964))); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 298 
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A governmental entity 
can abuse its power by allowing civil juries to impose ruinous punitive damages as a way of 
furthering the purposes of its criminal law.”); Mann, supra note 132, at 1814; Zipursky, supra 
note 7, at 149. 
255.  Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, in CRIME, LAW AND SOCIETY 61, 64-65 
(Abraham S. Goldstein & Joseph Goldstein eds., 1971). 
256.  Id. at 65. 
257.  See, e.g., Comment, supra note 121, at 410-11. 
258.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001); see also JOEL 
FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE 
THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98-99, 104 (1970) (embracing Hart’s theory but noting that 
punitive damages are a form of expressive condemnation); Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity of 
the Criminal Law: Toward a “Regulatory Model” of, or “Pathelogical Perspective” on, the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199, 200 (1996) (noting that the moral 
condemnation model does not distinguish punitive damages because “[p]unitive damages 
are welded to moral condemnation”). 
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Zipursky and Sebok doubt this line and its applicability to punitive 
damages. They do not see why the mere fact that punitive damages are 
punishment does not necessitate criminal procedural protections, regardless of 
whether they punish public or private wrongs. As Zipursky puts it, 
“punishment of private wrongs is still punishment, and it is therefore hard to 
explain why constitutional scrutiny appropriate to criminal punishment should 
apply to punishment of public wrongs but not to punishment of private 
wrongs.”259 Echoes Sebok, “it is hard to see why [Colby’s] argument does not 
cut against his preferred theory of punitive damages as private punishment as 
much as the theory he attacks—punitive damages as public punishment.”260 
After all,  
 
punishment of private wrongs is still punishment. Colby does not 
explain why, for instance, punishment of Jones by Private Citizen 
Smith for the wrong of stealing $10,000 would not be constrained by 
the same constitutional limits as punishment of Jones by the State of 
New York for larceny. . . . Why would due process not constrain 
Smith as a punisher in the same way that it constrains New York as a 
punisher?261  
 
I will endeavor here to explain, first by reference to the case law. The 
Supreme Court has held that criminal procedural safeguards do not apply to all 
“sanctions that could, in common parlance, be described as punishment.”262 
Rather, they apply only to “criminal punishments.”263 The Court generally 
defers to the legislative (or presumably common law) label of a sanction as 
criminal or civil, but “[e]ven in those cases where the legislature has ‘indicated 
an intention to establish a civil penalty, [it has] inquired further whether the 
statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect,’ as to ‘transform 
what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’”264 That 
inquiry is guided by the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez265: 
 
259.  Zipursky, supra note 7, at 142. 
260.  Sebok, supra note 78, at 1005. 
261.  Id. at 1004. 
262.  Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 
317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943)). 
263.  Id.  
264.  Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980); Rex Trailor Co. v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)). 
265.  372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
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(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; 
(2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; 
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; 
(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to 
which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose 
to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and 
(7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned.266 
 
These various factors will often point in different directions; the question is 
whether, considering them as a whole, they strongly contradict the legislative 
(or common law) civil label.267 
Because it has relied on history to avoid the constitutional inquiry, the 
Supreme Court has never subjected punitive damages to this test. But Justice 
O’Connor once observed that it is “easy to conclude that punitive damages are 
penal under the Mendoza-Martinez factors.”268 After all, they are and have 
historically been regarded as punishment; they only come into play on a 
finding of scienter; courts consistently speak of them as promoting the 
traditional aims of punishment (retribution and deterrence); they are quite 
often imposed for behavior that is also a crime; and the Supreme Court has 
conceded that, rather than serving some alternative purpose, they “serve the 
same purposes as criminal penalties.”269 
So then why do punitive damages not trigger criminal procedural 
protections? The answer is that Justice O’Connor was right: they do trigger 
those protections if they are understood as punishment for public wrongs, as they 
generally were at the time that Justice O’Connor was writing. But they do not 
trigger them if they are understood as punishment for private wrongs. The 
Mendoza-Martinez factors play out very differently if punitive damages are 
limited to punishment for private wrongs. When they are so limited, the last 
 
266.  Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. at 168-69). 
267.  See id. at 101. 
268.  Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 298 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
269.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003). See generally Grass, 
supra note 106, at 245-313 (applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to punitive damages); id. 
at 247 (“[T]he conclusion is inescapable that they are penal in nature, spirit, and 
jurisprudence, and thus mandate higher standards of procedural protection.”). 
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two factors come into play: there is an alternative, noncriminal purpose for 
them, and they are carefully limited to fulfilling that purpose. And the other 
factors also apply very differently to punishment for private wrongs. The 
Mendoza-Martinez formulation is misleading, insofar as it focuses on 
punishment simpliciter without explicitly incorporating the original test for 
determining whether a sanction is “penal” in the way that would bring it across 
the civil/criminal line. In Huntington v. Attrill, the Court held that “[t]he test 
whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary sense, is whether the wrong 
sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual, 
according to the familiar classification of Blackstone.”270 
Nearly a century ago, the Court relied on that principle in a case that held—
in an unusual context—that punitive damages are not penal within the 
meaning of the Huntington test. O’Sullivan v. Felix271 involved a civil rights 
action brought by a man who was beaten by two other men in a successful 
effort to keep him from exercising his right to vote. The question for the Court 
was whether the action was time-barred, which depended on whether or not it 
was a penal action. If it was, then a longer federal limitations period applied.272 
The Court explained that the federal civil rights laws in question provided for 
both “criminal proceedings and punishment for the public wrong, and actions 
in law or equity for the redress of any private injury.”273 The Court found it 
“very clear that the public wrong is punished by the fines and punishment 
prescribed” and “the private injuries inflicted are to be redressed by civil 
suit.”274 Citing Huntington, the Court concluded that the fact that the plaintiff 
demanded punitive damages stemming from the “signs of the degradation and 
humiliation placed upon him”275 was of no matter. Those damages were 
 
270.  146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892); see also 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 9 (2001) (quoting the Huntington 
test as a lead-in to the Mendoza-Martinez factors); Hall, supra note 214 (recognizing that the 
distinction between civil and criminal law is based primarily on the fact that the former 
seeks to remedy individual harm and the latter seeks to remedy social harm); cf. Bloom v. 
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968) (holding that when a contempt sanction operates as 
punishment for “a public wrong,” it is a criminal sanction and necessitates criminal 
procedural protections). See generally supra note 134 (noting that the law treats the terms 
“crime” and “public wrong” as synonymous). 
271.  233 U.S. 318 (1914). 
272.  See id. at 322. 
273.  Id. at 324. 
274.  Id. at 325. 
275.  Id. at 321. 
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intended to redress the private wrong to him, not the public wrong to society, 
and thus his action was not penal and was accordingly time-barred.276 
 
276.  To be fair, O’Sullivan may not be quite as clear a precedent as the text implies. In 
Huntington, the Court had explained, 
In the municipal law of England and America, the words “penal” and “penalty” 
have been used in various senses. Strictly and primarily, they denote punishment, 
whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or 
offense against its laws. But they are also commonly used as including any 
extraordinary liability to which the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person 
wronged, not limited to the damages suffered. 
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666-67 (1892) (citations omitted) (citing United States 
v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 611 (1880)). When it declared that whether a law is “penal” 
depends on whether it seeks to redress a public or a private wrong, the Huntington Court 
explained that it was using “penal” in “the strict and primary sense,” as opposed to the 
“commonly used” sense. Id. at 667-68. In citing Huntington, however, the O’Sullivan Court 
ran the two senses of “penal” together: “The term ‘penalty’ involves the idea of punishment 
for the infraction of the law, and is commonly used as including any extraordinary liability 
to which the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person wronged, not limited to the 
damages suffered.” 233 U.S. at 324 (citing Huntington, 146 U.S. at 666, 667; Chouteau, 102 
U.S. at 611).  
 It is possible to read O’Sullivan as not addressing the “strict and primary” sense of 
“penalty” at all, but rather as holding merely that the action was not “penal” even in the 
“commonly used” sense, because it did not involve “extraordinary liability,” but instead was 
“limited to the damages suffered.” But the Court emphasized that the plaintiff sought 
“damages in the sum of $25,000 ‘for the wounding less than mayhem,’ $25,000 ‘for the 
humiliation, degradation and public ridicule,’ and $10,000 ‘as punitive and exemplary 
damages.’” Id. at 325. Insofar as they were sought as a supplement to the compensatory 
damages for the physical injury and the “humiliation, degradation and public ridicule,” it is 
clear that the punitive damages were intended to go beyond compensation for the damages 
actually suffered. Immediately after defining the term “penalty” and citing Huntington, and 
immediately before listing the damages prayed by the plaintiff, the O’Sullivan Court gave 
the reason for its holding: “It is very clear that the public wrong is punished by the fines and 
punishment prescribed [by the criminal law], that the private injuries inflicted are to be 
redressed by civil suit, and the amount of recovery is determined by the extent of the injury 
received and the elements constituting it.” Id. The punitive damages went beyond 
compensation for the injury suffered, but they were still designed to redress, and 
“determined by the extent of,” that private injury—rather than the public wrong to society. 
See Colby, supra note 9, at 619, 639-40 (explaining that it was understood historically that, 
as punishment for private wrongs, “the proper amount of punitive damages depends on the 
severity of the injury to the plaintiff”). That is why they were not “penal.” See also James-
Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1927) (“Exemplary damages 
are recoverable at common law in many States. A statute providing for their recovery by and 
for the injured party is not a penal law [in the strict and primary sense].” (citing Huntington, 
146 U.S. at 666-83)); Gruetter v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 181 F. 248, 250-54 (C.C.W.D. 
Tenn. 1909) (stating that an action brought not to “remedy . . . any public wrong, but 
merely for punitive damages for the breach of a common-law obligation or private wrong” is 
“essentially civil in its nature” and is not penal within the meaning of Huntington); 
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The Huntington line also explains the Court’s general failure to afford 
criminal procedural protections to so-called civil penalties—penalty provisions 
in civil statutes. The Court has insisted, often through the operation of legal 
fictions, that these penalties are not punishment for public wrongs. This 
insistence goes all the way back to Blackstone, who included actions for 
statutory penalties in his volume on private wrongs, rather than his volume on 
public wrongs, on the theory that they are simply damages for the breach of 
the implied contract that every member of society makes with the King.277 It is 
admittedly difficult to see why a breach of that contract is a private wrong, 
rather than a public one, but Blackstone’s theory appears to be that the wrong 
was not visited upon the public order of the community, arousing fear and 
disorder in the public sphere, but rather was simply a breach of a private 
obligation to live up to the rules laid down by the government. The “victim” of 
that breach is the government, not society as a whole. The Supreme Court has 
employed similarly dubious fictions in upholding the constitutionality of 
various civil penalties, such as treble damages in antitrust and administrative 
penalties in environmental laws.278 The Court often finds, for instance, that the 
civil penalty is in reality simply a form of rough compensation to the 
government for the cost of enforcing the law, rather than an attempt to 
penalize the defendant for violating the law, and thus the penalty is really 
remedial, and is not punishment at all.279 
The Court’s use of dubious legal fictions in the civil penalties arena may 
not be particularly satisfying, and I make no effort to defend it. When it comes 
to punitive damages, however, there is either no need to employ similar legal 
fictions, or no opportunity to do so. As punishment for private wrongs, 
punitive damages really do serve a very different goal from the one that triggers 
criminal procedural safeguards. No fiction is necessary. But if punitive 
damages are punishment for public wrongs, then by definition they fall on the 
 
S. Ry. Co. v. Decker, 62 S.E. 678, 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (explaining that the fact “that the 
damages are punitive does not render the statute which prescribes them penal” unless they 
are imposed for the purpose of “vindicating the public justice of the state”). 
277.  See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 129, at *158-61; Mann, supra note 132, at 1820-21. 
278.  See Mann, supra note 132, at 1802, 1820-36. 
279.  See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977) (finding that 
treble damages in antitrust are “in essence a remedial” sanction); United States ex rel. 
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943) (holding that qui tam actions under the False 
Claims Act are civil because “[w]e cannot say that the remedy now before us requiring 
payment of a lump sum and double damages will do more than afford the government 
complete indemnity for the injuries done it”); Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. 531, 547 
(1871) (finding that private civil actions seeking double or treble damages are compensatory, 
not penal); Mann, supra note 132, at 1823-30. 
392.COLBY.479.DOC 12/22/2008  1:18:43 PM 
clearing the smoke from philip morris v. williams 
455 
 
criminal side of the line—they are the very definition of a criminal sanction. At 
that point, no fiction is possible; once we concede that they serve the same 
purpose as criminal sanctions, it is too late to come up with some sort of 
dubious legal fiction to avoid the Bill of Rights. 
The Constitution thus mandates that, absent criminal procedural 
safeguards, punitive damages may be employed as punishment for private 
wrongs, but not as punishment for public wrongs. The Court therefore 
reached the proper result when it held in Williams that procedural due process 
demands that punitive damages may not be imposed to punish the defendant 
for harm caused to anyone other than the private, individual victim before the 
court.280 
The boundary between criminal and civil law that I have set out and the 
conclusion that punitive damages fall on one side of the line when punishing 
private wrongs, and the other side of the line when punishing public wrongs,281 
 
280.  Of course, this conclusion does not apply when punitive damages are accompanied by 
criminal procedural safeguards. This Article does not consider the feasibility of imposing 
those safeguards in civil lawsuits. Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127 (2005) (requiring proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt for punitive damages). I hasten to add that the mere fact that a 
sanction falls on the criminal side of the line does not necessarily mean that the full panoply 
of criminal procedural safeguards must attach. The law has long recognized that minor 
criminal penalties can be imposed in the absence of some constitutional safeguards. See, e.g., 
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552 (1888) (holding that a jury trial is not required for petty 
criminal offenses); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 354 (1886) (holding that a grand 
jury indictment is required only for “infamous crimes”—those punishable by 
imprisonment). Thus, even though they are criminal in nature, awards of punitive damages 
(or other civil sanctions) that serve as punishment for public wrongs might not necessitate 
the full scope of criminal procedural safeguards, but would certainly trigger significantly 
greater procedural protections than are required when punishing private wrongs. 
281.  This does not mean that punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs raise no 
constitutional concerns. The Court has been forced by the language of the Bill of Rights—
many clauses of which apply only to “criminal” cases—to draw difficult lines and to hold on 
to a criminal/civil distinction that many legal theorists believe to be formalist and 
anachronistic. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 196, at 44 (announcing that “the general 
principles of criminal and civil liability are the same”); David Friedman, Beyond the 
Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 103, 108-12 (1996) (arguing that the distinction 
between crime and tort is simply the product of historical accident). But the Constitution 
does not necessitate a degree of formalism that rises to the level of fundamental unfairness. 
Civil procedure may not be limited by the various criminal procedural protections of the Bill 
of Rights, but it is limited by the Due Process Clause. And due process necessitates 
heightened procedural protections for many noncriminal punitive sanctions. See Hudson v. 
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102-03 (1997) (noting that even if a sanction is not criminal, its 
abusive potential is curbed by other constitutional provisions like the Due Process Clause). 
As such, the argument in this Article casts no doubt on the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
imposing procedural and substantive limits on punitive damages. It may, however, call into 
question Mark Geistfeld’s suggestion that the constitutional limits imposed by the Court’s 
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are not only consistent with the admittedly murky doctrine, but also make 
good theoretical sense.282 As Zipursky explains, punishment for private 
wrongs—which he calls the plaintiff’s private right to be punitive—is 
“importantly different from an exercise of the state power to punish” or from 
“the state authorizing an individual to carry out the state role of punishing.”283 
It allows the plaintiff to vindicate her personal, private interests. It is not an 
end run around the Bill of Rights—a conscription of the plaintiff to do the 
state’s dirty work without having to play by the rules imposed on the state by 
the Constitution. As Zipursky writes, 
 
The state might be happy about the consequences of such an award, 
and might even maintain its regime in part because of these recognized 
consequences. But if the state is imposing punitive damages out of 
respect for a right of private redress, then the reasons for providing 
criminal procedural protections are not necessarily implicated.284  
 
The Framers included criminal procedural protections in the Bill of Rights 
because they “fear[ed] the power of the state . . . to coerce and repress. They 
fear[ed] that the state will use that power to eliminate its political enemies, as 
 
pre-Williams punitive damages cases are likely applicable to other aspects of tort law, 
including pain and suffering damages. See Geistfeld, supra note 23, at 1101-12; see also BMW 
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). On my reading, 
those cases are best grounded in the fact that, unlike pain and suffering damages, punitive 
damages are punitive (albeit not criminal). See, e.g., Cooper Indus. Inc. v. Leatherman Tool 
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432-36 (2001) (emphasizing the similarities between the Court’s 
punitive damages cases and its criminal sanction cases). 
282.  Of course, if the Court were to take the line that I am advocating seriously, that decision 
would have implications extending beyond the realm of punitive damages: many ostensibly 
civil sanctions would be on tenuous constitutional footing. But those sanctions are already 
on tenuous constitutional footing. My line poses no greater threat to the current civil 
sanctioning regime than does the standard Mendoza-Martinez formulation, the full 
implications of which the Court has chosen to avoid through the use of legal fictions. If the 
Court wishes to continue to employ its legal fictions, it can explicitly endorse the proposed 
line without undermining other civil sanctions. Even if the Court were to purge its civil 
sanction jurisprudence of legal fictions, it is possible that many civil penalties might 
genuinely be justifiable on nonpunitive or private interest rationales. Those that could not 
would indeed have to be abandoned (or accompanied by heightened procedural safeguards), 
but doing so might not threaten the efficacy of the administrative regulatory state as much 
as one might fear. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, The Multiple Middlegrounds Between 
Civil and Criminal Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1901 (1992) (arguing that heightened procedural 
protections might not undermine the use or efficacy of civil administrative penalties). 
283.  Zipursky, supra note 7, at 153. 
284.  Id. at 156. 
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almost every state in human history has done.”285 When punitive damages are 
used to vindicate the state’s interests, they implicate those fears. When they are 
used to vindicate purely private interests, they do not.286 
 
D. Deterrence: The Elephant in the Room? 
The foregoing explains the retributive role of punitive damages. We are 
left, however, to grapple with the concept of deterrence. Courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have long maintained that “[p]unitive damages may properly 
be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful 
conduct and deterring its repetition.”287 The Williams Court began its analysis 
 
285.  Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1457; see also Dripps, supra note 258, at 204-05 (noting 
that the political origins of the criminal procedural safeguards in the Bill of Rights can be 
found in the Enlightenment desire to prevent the government from using its power to 
disable political opposition or to maliciously victimize members of politically unpopular 
groups); Fellmeth, supra note 198, at 25 (“[T]he Bill of Rights was adopted primarily to 
protect citizens against the threats posed to their civil liberties by a state, motivated by 
ephemeral political forces, that may be less solicitous of those rights.”); id. at 31-34 (arguing 
that the enhanced procedural protections of the Bill of Rights are needed only when the 
state, because its interest is directly at stake in the proceeding, has an incentive to abuse its 
power to punish the defendant). 
286.  Redish and Mathews argue that punitive damages are unconstitutional because they 
represent a “[d]irect vindication of the public interest [which] must be deemed a purely 
public power,” and due process precludes the transfer of public power to private individuals. 
Redish & Mathews, supra note 123, at 3-7, 13, 19. Whatever its merits may be, that argument 
is premised on the notion that punitive damages are punishment for public wrongs. Redish 
and Mathews focus on “the wholly punitive, and therefore purely public, nature of punitive 
damages,” id. at 4, and argue that “when a private plaintiff furthers the public interest by 
collecting what amounts to a civil fine, that plaintiff is no longer pursuing his own private 
interest but rather is doing nothing more than effectively acting as an agent of the state,” id. 
at 16; see also id. at 33 (arguing that punitive damages “represent nothing more than a 
financial inducement to have these plaintiffs enforce the coercive power of the state”). As 
punishment for private wrongs, however, punitive damages are designed to vindicate 
private interests, not public ones. Of course, they still benefit the state in a number of ways. 
See generally Michael L. Rustad, How the Common Good Is Served by the Remedy of Punitive 
Damages, 64 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1997) (discussing the public benefits of punitive damages). 
But the mere “fact that punitive damages benefit the public interest does not mean that the 
point of the practice is to serve public ends.” Sebok, supra note 78, at 1035. And so long as 
their purpose is to serve private, not public ends, they cannot be unconstitutional for the 
reasons offered by Redish and Mathews. Indeed, Redish and Mathews admit that 
compensatory damages in tort also serve ends desired by the state, but they conclude that 
the fact that compensatory damages at the same time serve valuable private ends is sufficient 
to sustain their constitutionality. See Redish & Mathews, supra note 123, at 49-50. The same 
must be true of punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs. 
287.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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with a de rigueur recounting of that basic proposition—that punitive damages 
serve the goals of both punishment and deterrence.288 But then it never 
mentioned deterrence again; it focused only on punishment.289 What are we to 
make of that omission? One can easily imagine a situation in which the 
retributive punishment for a relatively minor private wrong to the plaintiff 
would be insufficient to deter the defendant and others from engaging in 
similar wrongdoing in the future. That is especially likely to be the case when 
the defendant profits from imposing relatively minor harms on many victims, 
only a small number of whom are likely to bring successful lawsuits. If any 
punitive awards are limited only to the amount necessary to avenge the 
moderate harm to the individual plaintiff, a rational defendant might well 
conclude that the expected profits still outweigh the expected damages and 
might continue to engage in the wrongdoing. 
Some commentators have speculated that perhaps Williams essentially 
rejected the traditional deterrence rationale for punitive damages, leaving only 
the retributive one.290 At the opposite extreme, other commentators have 
suggested that perhaps Williams addressed only the retributive role of punitive 
damages, not the deterrent one, and thus still allows the jury to punish the 
defendant for harm to others, so long as it is done in the name of deterrence, 
rather than retribution.291 As I shall explain shortly, however, Williams need 
not be read to be either so radical292 or so inconsequential. 
But first, consider a third possibility: that Williams was wrongly decided—
and that my theory of punitive damages is erroneous—for failing to take into 
account the proper role of deterrence in punitive damages law. That is the 
 
288.  See 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1062 (2007). 
289.  See Michael P. Allen, Of Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation of Punitive Damages: The 
Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 365 (2008). 
290.  See id.; Hubbard, supra note 56, at 378, 382. 
291.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, More Questions About Punitive Damages, TRIAL, May 2007, at 72, 74 
(2007) (implying this possibility). 
292.  That the Court has not abandoned the deterrence rationale for punitive damages is clear 
from its opinion in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008), decided a year after 
Williams. Exxon is an atypical punitive damages case because the Court was exercising its 
maritime jurisdiction “in the manner of a common law court,” id. at 2619, and thus was 
“reviewing a jury award for conformity with maritime law, rather than the outer limit 
allowed by due process,” id. at 2626. Still, even though the maritime common law 
excessiveness inquiry “precedes and . . . obviate[s] any application of the constitutional 
standard,” id., the Court made clear that it was articulating its general “understanding of the 
place of punishment in modern civil law and reasonable standards of process in 
administering punitive law,” id. at 2620; see also id. at 2634 n.28 (noting that the Court’s 
analysis “may well” govern the constitutional inquiry). Deterrence concerns weighed very 
heavily in the Exxon Court’s analysis. See id. at 2621-22, 2625, 2628, 2633 & n.27. 
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argument of Akhil Amar and Arthur McEvoy, who claim that “Colby argues 
that courts have always conceived of exemplary damages ‘as punishment for 
the private legal wrong—the insult—done to the individual plaintiff,’” and then 
reject that argument as “flawed” because it ignores the long history of judicial 
recognition of the legitimate deterrent goal of punitive damages.293 Although 
Amar and McEvoy make an important point, their objection does not take 
them as far as they want to go.294 
The Supreme Court’s occasional references to punitive damages as serving 
the twin goals of “punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition”295 
are, as Judge Posner has explained, “cryptic, since deterrence is a purpose of 
punishment, rather than, as th[at] formulation implies, a parallel purpose, 
along with punishment itself, for imposing the specific form of punishment 
 
293.  Brief of Akhil Reed Amar and Arthur McEvoy as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 
9 n.10, Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256) [hereinafter Amar and McEvoy Brief] 
(quoting Colby, supra note 9). 
294.  To be clear, I do not mean to claim that courts always viewed punitive damages as 
punishment for private wrongs. My historical claim is that, when they understood punitive 
damages as punishment, courts traditionally viewed them as punishment for private wrongs, 
not public ones. I must be careful not to overstate even that claim. There is at least one case 
in which “punitive damages were not just levied to punish the harm done to a single 
plaintiff, but to the entire society.” Rustad, supra note 239, at 475. In McBride v. McLaughlin, 
5 Watts 375 (Pa. 1836), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared, “There are offences 
against morals to which the law has annexed no penalty as public wrongs, and which would 
pass without reprehension did not the providence of the courts permit the private remedy to 
become an instrument of public correction.” Id. at 376. The McBride court opined that “no 
other principle” can explain damages above the level necessary for compensation than that 
their true purpose is to punish the wrong to society. Id. It specifically rejected the notion 
that the damages might be explained as vindicating the resentment of the victim, declaring 
that the “purposes of the law are more elevated than the gratification of revenge.” Id. at 376-
77. But later in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania changed course 
(in a case that, unlike McBride, raised double jeopardy concerns because the defendant’s 
conduct was also punishable as a crime) and held that punitive damages punish only private 
wrongs to individuals. See Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385, 393-94 (1878). Similarly, the high court 
of Mississippi once declared that it is the “duty” of the jury in cases in which “the law 
provides no other penalty” to impose punitive damages as “proper punishment for the 
disregard of public duty,” in “the interests of society.” New Orleans, Jackson & Great N. 
R.R. Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660, 666 (1859). But that court subsequently reversed course 
and declared that, although they serve “the public good, by deterring the offender and 
others from like offenses,” the “imposition of [punitive] damages is not for the purpose of 
punishing an offense against the public justice, but rather to afford redress to the person 
injured.” Louisville & N.R. Co. v. McCaskell, 53 So. 348, 349 (Miss. 1910); see also Colby, 
supra note 9, at 620 & n.130 (noting that some early courts found that allowing punitive 
damages when the defendant’s conduct was also punishable as a crime was inconsistent 
with double jeopardy principles). 
295.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
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that is punitive damages.”296 Deterrence is not distinct from punishment; it is 
rather one of the two principal goals of punishment, the other being 
retribution. Thus, the Court is more accurate when it employs the formulation 
that punitive damages are imposed as punishment “for purposes of retribution 
and deterrence.”297 
It follows that the notion that punitive damages must be punishment for 
private wrongs, rather than public ones, incorporates the notion of deterrence. 
If deterrence is a purpose of punishment, and if the state cannot engage in 
punishment to serve the public good without criminal procedural safeguards, 
then it follows that the state cannot employ punitive damages to achieve the 
public benefits of deterrence without affording criminal procedural safeguards. 
Constitutionally, whether they seek retribution, deterrence, or both, punitive 
damages may punish only for private wrongs. 
Amar and McEvoy are surely correct that early courts at times spoke of 
punitive damages as serving the societal goal of deterrence.298 To the extent 
that my prior work failed to make that sufficiently clear, it was admittedly 
incomplete.299 But those early courts tended to view punitive damages as 
vindicating public interests, rather than private ones.300 Amar and McEvoy 
might have also cited Bishop v. Stockton, in which the court declared that 
“exemplary damages may be given to indemnify the public for past injuries and 
damages, and to protect the community from future risks and wrongs.”301 
Once courts began to confront the constitutional obstacles to using 
punitive damages to vindicate society’s interests, however, they backed away 
 
296.  Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996). See generally United States v. Bajakajian, 524 
U.S. 321, 329 (1998) (“Deterrence . . . has traditionally been viewed as a goal of 
punishment . . . .”). 
297.  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991). 
298.  Sebok explains, however, that claiming that most of these cases stand for the proposition 
that “exemplary damages served a deterrence rationale” paints “too crude and hasty a 
picture of the meaning of exemplary damages.” Sebok, supra note 99, at 202-03. In fact, to 
most of these early courts, “the point of such damages was not to prevent similar acts by 
allowing future wrongdoers to weigh the cost of their wrongdoing, but to use the past 
wrongdoing as an opportunity for the community to frame a norm.” Id. at 203. This was 
more of an “expressive use of punishment” than a deterrent one. Id. Sebok explains that a 
genuine deterrence rationale was surprisingly rare in nineteenth-century cases. Id. 
299.  But cf. Colby, supra note 9, at 636, 668-70 (discussing the deterrent role of punitive 
damages). 
300.  See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 493 (C.P.) (rejecting the argument of 
the Solicitor General that “a private action [cannot be] represented as the cause of all the 
good people of England”). 
301.  3 F. Cas. 453, 455 (Baldwin, Circuit Justice, C.C.W.D. Pa. 1843) (No. 1440). 
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from that rationale, as my prior work makes clear. Amar and McEvoy concede 
that their historical analysis “do[es] not consider cases founded on 
retribution.”302 That exclusion is difficult to justify when seeking to determine 
whether punitive damages can be used to punish the defendant for the harm 
done to third parties or to society. Deterrence and retribution are two sides of 
the punishment coin; the recognition in the retribution cases that the 
defendant cannot be punished for public wrongs had significant implications 
for the constitutional role of deterrence. Amar and McEvoy fail to cite or even 
to acknowledge the existence of the many nineteenth-century cases that treated 
punitive damages as punishment only for the private wrong to the 
individual.303 Nor do they address the crucial fact that the courts so held in the 
course of justifying the existence and constitutionality of punitive damages.304 
One cannot properly assemble a puzzle if one leaves half of the pieces in the 
box.305 
When courts began to recognize that punitive damages must vindicate 
private interests rather than public ones, they began to downplay the deterrent 
purpose of punitive damages. Consider, for instance, Wardrobe v. California 
Stage Co., a stagecoach accident case in which the California Supreme Court 
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff because the jury had been charged that it 
could give punitive damages “such as would be an example thereafter, which 
would tend to prevent such recklessness in the conduct of stages to the great 
peril of passengers.”306 The court found this instruction “obnoxious” because it 
“devolves upon the jury the duty of punishing the defendants for what the 
Court seems to consider an offense to society, and by inflicting a penalty upon 
them, securing, by force of the example, future safety for the public.”307 The 
court explained that the plaintiff could not act as “a public prosecutor, to 
vindicate the wrongs of the community; he was not the medium through 
 
302.  Amar and McEvoy Brief, supra note 293, at 3. 
303.  See Colby, supra note 9, at 614-29. 
304.  See supra Part III. 
305.  Indeed, any puzzle that could be pieced together using only the deterrence cases would not 
match the picture on the box. As I have explained, the fact that punitive damages were 
understood as punishment for private wrongs explains many features of historical and 
current punitive damages doctrine—such as the rule that punitive damages may be awarded 
only when the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for an underlying tort, and the rule that the 
amount of punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the amount of 
compensatory damages—that appear nonsensical under a view of punitive damages as 
serving society’s interest in deterrence. See Colby, supra note 9, at 637-43. 
306.  7 Cal. 119, 120 (1857).  
307.  Id. 
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which these rights were to be asserted or maintained.”308 He could recover 
punitive damages beyond mere compensation for his injuries, but he could not 
recover damages that “are professedly laid for the benefit of the public.”309 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, as they came to recognize that 
punitive damages exist to vindicate private interests, not public ones, the courts 
began to view the deterrent effect of punitive damages as merely a happy side 
effect of their primary role as private revenge.310 The standard judicial 
pronouncement was that “[e]xemplary, vindictive, or punitory damages are 
such as blend together the interests of society and of the aggrieved individual, 
and are not only a recompense to the suffering, but also a punishment to the 
offender and an example to the community.”311 In other words, by punishing 
the private wrong to the victim, punitive damages achieve a deterrent effect 
that benefits all of society, but that public benefit is merely an incidental effect 
of the private punishment–and an unavoidable one at that. As the Iowa 
Supreme Court explained, 
 
It is claimed by defendant’s counsel that, in civil cases, damages ought 
to be limited to the extent that will operate alone upon the offender as 
a punishment, and a restraint of his future conduct; the example to 
others ought to be kept out of view. This is impossible, because, in all 
cases of punishment, the example will reach and affect the public. 
There cannot be a punishment without an example; the two are 
inseparable. If punishment be administered so there will be no 
example for the good or ill of the public, it ceases to be punishment.312 
 
But punitive damages “are never allowed alone for the purpose of public 
good through the example given in their assessment”; rather, “[t]he effect 
upon the public is but an incident” of the private punishment.313 In other 
 
308.  Id. 
309.  Id. 
310.  Cf. MURPHY, supra note 195, at 17 (arguing that when punishment is imposed as vengeance, 
deterrence is simply an accidental byproduct). 
311.  Fla. Cent. & Peninsular R.R. v. Mooney, 24 So. 148, 150 (Fla. 1898). 
312.  Ward v. Ward, 41 Iowa 686, 688 (1875). 
313.  Id.; see also Watts v. S. Bound R.R., 38 S.E. 240, 242 (S.C. 1901) (“[P]unitive damages go to 
the plaintiff, not as a fine or penalty for a public wrong, but in vindication of a private right 
which has been willfully invaded; and, indeed, it may be said that such damages in a 
measure . . . satisfy for the willfulness with which the private right was invaded, but, in 
addition thereto, operating as a deterring punishment to the wrongdoer, and as a warning 
to others.”). 
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words, public deterrence is an unavoidable (albeit perfectly desirable) result of 
punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs, but it is not and cannot be 
the driving force behind them. The jury cannot calibrate the damages by 
reference to the societal benefits of deterrence, and a punitive damages award 
that exceeds the appropriate level of retributive punishment for the private 
wrong cannot be justified on the ground that it is necessary to achieve the 
societal benefits of deterrence. To do so would be to convert it into a form of 
unconstitutional punishment for public wrongs. 
There is, however, more to be said in favor of deterrence, even under a 
private revenge model of punitive damages. The fact that it is inappropriate to 
use punitive damages to serve society’s interest in deterrence does not mean that 
deterrence is a wholly impermissible goal. Just as punitive damages are 
appropriate to satisfy the individual victim’s private interest in retribution—
revenge—so too are they appropriate to satisfy the individual victim’s private 
interest in deterrence. The victim clearly has an interest in ensuring that the 
defendant does not victimize her again.314 Thus, if a punitive damages award 
calculated by reference to her interest in individual revenge is not sufficient to 
deter the defendant from continuing to place her at risk of future harm, then it 
would be appropriate to increase the award even further.315 In that limited, but 
nonetheless significant,316 respect, I agree with Amar and McEvoy that 
deterrence is and has always been a legitimate use for punitive damages.317 That 
 
314.  See, e.g., Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 562 (1886) (noting that a plaintiff may recover 
“exemplary damages calculated to vindicate his right and protect it against future similar 
invasio[n]s”). 
315.  In doing so, however, the jury (and reviewing court) should focus only on the individual 
harm to the plaintiff. It should set the penalty at the amount that will ensure that the 
expected sanction for the wrong to the plaintiff (the total amount of punitive and 
compensatory liability multiplied by the likelihood that the private wrong would be 
successfully detected and prosecuted) exceeds the expected profit from the wrong to the 
plaintiff. This calculation is unaffected by whether the defendant actually harmed anyone 
else; it seeks only to ensure that it will not be profitable for the defendant to wrong the 
plaintiff again. See Geistfeld, supra note 125, at 301-02. To set the penalty with regard to 
actual harm to others, and the likelihood that the defendant will escape liability for it, is to 
impermissibly punish for the harm to nonparties. See Colby, supra note 9, at 668-71. 
316.  Although this notion of deterrence is limited to the individual’s interest, not society’s, it 
“can sometimes yield very high punitive damages.” Colby, supra note 9, at 669. 
317.  I disagree, however, that punitive damages may be used to completely “deter . . . others . . . 
from similar conduct in the future.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979). 
That might be a welcome side effect of punitive damages, but it cannot be a driving force 
behind them without violating procedural due process. See Galligan, supra note 10, at 126 
(observing that my theory is inconsistent with this claimed purpose of punitive damages). 
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interest was not at play in Williams, however, insofar as the individual victim 
was deceased and thus no longer at risk of harm.318 
What is more, as Part V explains, if extracompensatory damages awards are 
divested of any pretense to punishment, Williams does not stand in the way of 
their use to achieve a different sort of deterrence. 
 
E. Evidence of Harm to Others To Determine Reprehensibility: The Exception 
that Swallowed the Rule? 
Thus far, I have sought to establish that punitive damages may not be used 
to punish the defendant (in the name of retribution or deterrence) for the harm 
caused to nonparties. Williams reached the correct result, albeit with 
inadequate reasoning. But what then to make of the Williams Court’s 
declaration that, even though the jury may not punish the defendant for 
harming third parties, it may nonetheless consider that harm “in order to 
demonstrate reprehensibility”?319 Commentators have tended to agree with the 
Williams dissenters that that distinction is so elusive as to be nonsensical.320 
The problem is that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore, which Williams purports to follow, the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct is the “most important” factor in 
determining the appropriate size of the punitive damages award.321 Williams 
says that juries should consider harm to others in determining the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, and that juries should base the size 
of the punitive damages award on that degree of reprehensibility, but that 
juries cannot “use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on 
account of harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties.”322 Is that not 
inherently contradictory? One commentator illustrates the absurdity with a 
proposed jury instruction: 
 
 
318.  See Geistfeld, supra note 125, at 266-67. Geistfeld suggests that the interest in private 
revenge similarly is not at play in wrongful death actions. See id. at 272-73. But an individual 
has a strong dignitary interest in ensuring that her wrongful death will be avenged—every 
bit as much of an interest as she has in ensuring that her family or her estate will be 
compensated for the injury causing her death. 
319.  127 S. Ct. 1057, 1064 (2007); see supra Section II.B. 
320.  See, e.g., Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Allen, supra note 289, at 359; Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip 
Morris v. Williams, 27 REV. LITIG. 9, 31 (2007); Kmiec, supra note 56. 
321.  517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
322.  127 S. Ct. at 1064. 
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Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are permitted to consider injury 
to nonparties to determine the level of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct; however, you may not consider injury to 
nonparties when determining the amount of punitive damages to 
assess. The most important factor in determining the amount of 
punitive damages to assess is the level of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct.323 
 
On its face, that does indeed appear to be absurd. And the opinion only 
makes things worse when it declares that it is appropriate to consider harm to 
others in the name of reprehensibility because “[e]vidence of actual harm to 
nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also 
posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public.”324 This passage suggests 
that punitive damages awards can be used to redress the wrong to society by 
punishing the defendant for the harm that it caused—or threatened—to the 
general public, which is inconsistent with the notion that punitive damages 
must punish only private wrongs. And, as I have endeavored to demonstrate, 
the notion that punitive damages may punish only private wrongs is essential 
to the ultimate conclusion in Williams that it is unconstitutional to use punitive 
damages to punish the defendant for the harm to nonparties. So once again, 
the Court’s reasoning seems contradictory and absurd. 
Still, I believe that here, too, the Court essentially reached the correct 
result, albeit on the wrong rationale. Harm to others can be considered, in a 
limited way, in determining the reprehensibility of the wrong, and hence the 
amount of punitive damages—but not for the reason stated by the Court. 
The reprehensibility inquiry does not examine the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct in the abstract. Rather, once we recognize that punitive 
damages may serve as punishment only for the private wrong to the plaintiff, it 
follows that the only “reprehensibility” that matters is the reprehensibility of 
the private tort—the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s wrongful 
disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. Whether the defendant’s conduct harmed or 
threatened harm to the general public is generally irrelevant to the 
reprehensibility of the private wrong; it is relevant only in determining the 
reprehensibility of the public wrong, which is not at issue in punitive damages 
cases. Still, if the fact that the defendant also harmed other individuals 
 
323.  Daniel Sulser Agle, Comment, Working the Unworkable Rule Established in Philip Morris: 
Acknowledging the Difference Between Actual and Potential Injury to Nonparties, 2007 BYU L. 
REV. 1317, 1355. 
324.  Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1064. 
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illuminates the degree of reprehensibility of the wrong done to the plaintiff, 
then it might be relevant and admissible in a punitive damages case.325 Michael 
Rustad offers a classic example in the case in which a jury “punished a 
television manufacturer for failing to take prompt remedial steps after it 
learned that its television sets caused a series of home fires.”326 Rustad worries 
that the “admissibility of the other house fires caused by spontaneous 
combustion of the defective components would be questionable after 
Williams.”327 But it should not be. The evidence of previous, known harm to 
others helps to demonstrate the reprehensibility of the decision to go ahead 
and sell the defective product to the plaintiff.328 It is therefore admissible, but 
only for this purpose.329 
Seen in this light, the Williams exception is both sensible—the 
reprehensibility of a tort often cannot be adequately ascertained in a vacuum—
and workable. If evidence of harm to others is admitted, the jury can and must 
be instructed that it can consider that evidence only to the extent that it aids in 
ascertaining the degree of reprehensibility of the individual wrong done to the 
plaintiff alone. The jury must be told that its job is to punish the defendant 
only for what it did to the plaintiff; it may not seek to punish the defendant for 
the harm that it caused to anyone else. 
 
325.  See Sebok, supra note 78, at 1032. 
326.  Michael L. Rustad, The Supreme Court and Me: Trapped in Time with Punitive Damages, 17 
WIDENER L.J. 783, 823 (2008) (citation omitted). 
327.  Id. at 823-24. 
328.  To give another example, if the defendant vandalized the plaintiff’s property, evidence that 
the defendant does that sort of thing all the time could make his intentional disregard of the 
plaintiff’s rights appear more reprehensible than would evidence that he had been trying to 
impress new friends by following through on a dare, and had never done anything like this 
before in his life. See Colby, supra note 9, at 667 (“[A] wrongful refusal to pay benefits due 
under an insurance policy would be more reprehensible—and thus deserving of greater 
punishment—if it were a part of a nationwide and company-wide practice of victimizing 
elderly or otherwise vulnerable insureds than it would be if it were simply the result of an 
isolated act of wrongdoing by one unsavory employee.”). One imagines that, in many 
contexts, the fact that the defendant harmed only the plaintiff would make the private 
wrong more, rather than less, reprehensible. Plaintiff’s counsel would be free to argue that 
the fact that the defendant treated every other customer with dignity and respect, but 
singled out the plaintiff alone for abuse, makes the disregard of the plaintiff’s human dignity 
all the more reprehensible because it suggests that the wrongdoing was not simply an 
indiscriminately employed unsavory business practice—it was a personal slight. 
329.  And, of course, a trial judge should exercise caution in ensuring that the probative value of 
such evidence is not outweighed by its potential for prejudice. 
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v. future: the end of law and economics? 
What implications does Williams have for the future of punitive damages? 
On one reading, it essentially does nothing to change the practice of punitive 
damages on the ground. Because the jurors can still hear evidence of harm to 
others, any attempt to cabin what they do with that evidence through jury 
instructions will be futile, and they will go on imposing total harm punitive 
damages.330 
I am skeptical of that assertion. A properly instructed jury should be able to 
see the difference between punishing the defendant for harming thousands or 
millions of victims, and considering harm to others only to provide the context 
necessary to determine the reprehensibility of the defendant’s disregard of the 
individual plaintiff’s rights. Specifically telling the jurors that they must punish 
the defendant only for what it did to the plaintiff, and that they are strictly 
forbidden from seeking to punish the defendant for what it did to anyone else, 
should lead to very different results in many cases. That is especially likely to 
be the case when accompanied by a rule that precludes plaintiff’s counsel from 
making arguments about the appropriate punishment for injuring or killing 
thousands of people.331 In addition, reviewing courts will be more aggressive in 
striking down awards that would be reasonable as punishment for the full 
societal harm, but are excessive as punishment for the individual tort. Williams 
will, I believe, make a real difference. It will put an end to total harm punitive 
damages.332 
But does it go too far? As a matter of retribution, I do not believe so. 
Williams allows the plaintiff to seek individualized revenge, which is the only 
retributive interest that can and should be at play in a civil lawsuit. 
 
330.  See Sebok, supra note 78, at 1033 (suggesting that there will only be a “miniscule practical 
effect of adopting [Williams’s] semantic distinction” between directly punishing harm to 
nonparties and considering that harm in determining reprehensibility); Insurance Companies 
Heart Williams Case, TortsProf Blog, Feb. 21, 2007, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
tortsprof/2007/02/insurance_compa.html (“I would wager it will make exactly zero 
difference in the outcome.”); cf. Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 83, 150-53 (2007) (arguing that Williams will not preclude total harm punitive 
damages in environmental cases). 
331.  See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 420 (2003) (noting that 
the plaintiff’s attorney told the jurors that they were “going to be evaluating and assessing, 
and hopefully requiring State Farm to stand accountable for what it’s doing across the 
country, which is the purpose of punitive damages”). 
332.  Cf. Goldberg, supra note 125, at 7-8 (arguing that a private punishment view of punitive 
damages will tend to yield substantially lower awards than a public punishment and 
deterrence conception). 
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Deterrence, however, may be a different story. The law and economics 
approach to punitive damages argues that punitive damages should serve as an 
engine of optimal deterrence; they should be used to ensure that the defendant 
internalizes the full social cost of its behavior. Compensatory damages are 
frequently insufficient to achieve that goal, insofar as defendants often escape 
liability for some of the harm that they cause. A rational actor might therefore 
engage in economically inefficient behavior—behavior that imposes more costs 
than benefits upon society—because it knows that it will receive the full 
benefits of the behavior, but will likely only be forced to bear a small portion of 
the costs. The object of punitive damages, on this view, is to ensure that 
potential wrongdoers understand that, even if they will escape compensatory 
liability for some of the harm that they cause, they will still be forced to 
internalize the full scope of the cost of their conduct through punitive damages 
awards. As such, they will have the proper incentive to engage in the behavior 
only to an economically efficient degree, and will expend appropriate resources 
to avoid causing harm (but only to the extent that the cost of the harm exceeds 
the cost of avoiding it).333 
I have previously argued that, under this model, total harm punitive 
damages pose a serious risk of overdeterrence—of discouraging socially 
beneficial conduct.334 But perhaps eliminating them and focusing only on the 
private wrong to the individual victim will result in underdeterrence—that is, 
will fail to discourage socially harmful conduct. The risk of underdeterrence 
should not be overstated; as noted above, the deterrent potential of 
punishment for private wrongs is actually quite substantial.335 Still, it is quite 
possible that punishing only the private wrong will have the effect of 
underdeterring in many circumstances, such as in wrongful death actions, 
when the victim no longer has a private interest in deterrence that can be 
considered in assessing punitive damages. 
One imagines that some state legislatures (or state courts) might seek to do 
something about that.336 Taking the advice of law and economics scholars, they 
might want to create an extracompensatory sanction designed to achieve 
optimal deterrence by ensuring that the defendant fully internalizes the costs of 
its behavior. 
 
333.  See, e.g., Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243-44 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive 
Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 40-58 (1990); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 877-96; 
Sharkey, supra note 9, at 365-70. 
334.  See Colby, supra note 9, at 612 n.98. 
335.  See supra Section IV.D. 
336.  See Sharkey, supra note 9, at 414-28. 
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A number of commentators have opined that Williams forecloses the states 
from doing so.337 That view is certainly understandable if one accepts the 
Williams reasoning on its face. Ensuring that the defendant internalizes all of 
the social costs of its activity turns the focus to the harms allegedly visited upon 
nonparties, which Williams appears to preclude.338 But if one accepts the thesis 
of this Article—that ultimately Williams must rest on the principle that it is 
unconstitutional to punish for public wrongs without criminal procedural 
safeguards—then the issue looks very different. 
The cost-internalization sanction favored by the law and economics school 
seeks to serve the public good, rather than to vindicate a private tort right of 
the plaintiff. Indeed, it seeks to fix the sanction by reference to “the total harm 
caused” by the defendant339—“the harms inflicted by the defendant upon 
parties not before the court,” including both “‘specific harms’ to identifiable 
individuals, and more ‘diffuse harms’ that affect society in general.”340 That 
sanction is certainly “quite similar” 341 to the total harm punitive damages that I 
have argued are unconstitutional, and that Williams has struck down. But it is 
not the same thing, and the distinction makes all the difference.342 
 
337.  See Allen, supra note 289, at 368 (finding it “unlikely” that the optimal deterrence rationale 
for punitive damages “survived Philip Morris”); Hubbard, supra note 56, at 384 (arguing 
that, in the line of cases culminating in Williams, the Court has used “the Due Process 
Clause to deny a state the right to apply these widely accepted theories in adopting an 
approach to deterrence”); Hylton, supra note 320, at 17-21; Rustad, supra note 8, at 499-501; 
Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Punitive Damages 
Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 52-53, 
on file with author); Paul B. Rietema, Recent Development, Reconceptualizing Split-Recovery 
Statutes: Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct 1057 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1159, 1166 (2008) (“By prohibiting consideration of third-party harm, the Court has, under 
the guise of the Due Process Clause, mandated an individual-oriented punitive 
framework. . . . [S]tates may no longer use punitive damages to encourage socially optimal 
deterrence as traditionally conceived—where the focus is on creating full internalization of 
harm in a world of partial enforcement . . . .”). 
338.  Similarly, if the result in Williams is grounded, as other defenders of the decision would 
have it, in the civil recourse principle—that tort remedies may not be employed for the 
primary purpose of serving public regulatory goals, see supra note 125 and accompanying 
text—then the law and economics model fails for shifting the focus from the victim’s 
interests to society’s. See also supra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of 
Martin Redish and Andrew Mathews). 
339.  Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
340.  Sharkey, supra note 9, at 392. 
341.  Anthony J. Sebok, Deterrence or Disgorgement? Reading Ciraolo after Campbell, 64 MD. L. 
REV. 541, 566 n.126 (2005). 
342.  For an initial discussion of the difference between cost internalization and total harm 
punitive damages, see Colby, supra note 9, at 612 n.98. 
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This Article has sought to explain that, in order to be criminal in nature 
and thus to necessitate criminal procedural protections, a sanction must not 
only seek to redress the harm to society; it must seek to punish the defendant 
for the harm to society. It must be a form of punishment. As such, the fact that 
cost internalization takes into account the harm to others to serve the public 
interest does not make it criminal, unless it is also a form of punishment. Of 
course, at first glance, it might appear that it is indeed punishment. It is 
imposed in the name of deterrence, which, as noted above, is a goal of 
punishment.343 But the matter is not quite so simple. Although it is often 
averred that “when it comes to deterrence, civil and criminal remedies are 
essentially indistinguishable and interchangeable,”344 in fact, properly 
understood, the deterrence sought by civil remedies is distinct from the 
deterrence sought by criminal ones.345 
How to articulate that distinction is a matter of some dispute. Mark 
Geistfeld opines that the distinction has to do with whom the remedy seeks to 
deter. A remedy that seeks “specific deterrence”—deterrence of the defendant 
alone—is civil, but a remedy that seeks “general deterrence”—deterrence of 
others besides the defendant—is criminal.346 Thomas Galligan draws the line 
in the same terms, but reaches the very opposite conclusion: a remedy that 
seeks specific deterrence is criminal, but a remedy that seeks general deterrence 
is noncriminal.347 John Coffee, by contrast, draws the civil/criminal line not on 
the basis of the identity of the person or persons that the remedy seeks to 
deter—the defendant alone or all other potential wrongdoers—but rather on 
the basis of the level of deterrence sought—whether the sanction seeks to deter 
the activity completely, or merely to ensure that the defendant engages in it 
only to a socially optimal degree.348 Along those lines, Keith Hylton explains 
that the “traditional notion of deterrence in the criminal punishment literature 
is one of ‘complete deterrence,’ of stopping offenders from committing 
 
343.  See supra Section IV.D. 
344.  Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law 
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1325, 1355 (1991). 
345.  See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 
421 (1998). 
346.  Geistfeld, supra note 23, at 1096-99. 
347.  Galligan, supra note 10, at 148. 
348.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—
And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1884 (1992). 
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offensive acts.”349 By contrast, the “alternative, more recent notion of 
deterrence, largely observed in the torts literature, is that of ‘appropriate or 
optimal deterrence,’ which implies deterring offensive conduct only up to the 
point at which society begins to lose more from deterrence efforts than from 
the offenses it deters.”350 
It is my position that, in fact, the line between civil and criminal deterrence 
turns on both of these factors. Again, because criminal penalties punish public 
wrongs, criminal deterrence must both be punishment and be intended for the 
good of society. It is a two-prong inquiry, and each of these factors addresses a 
different prong. 
The first question is whether the deterrence is punitive. This inquiry turns 
on the degree of deterrence sought. Optimal deterrence does not necessarily 
seek to prevent conduct. It merely seeks to ensure that an actor who engages in 
the conduct employs the proper safety precautions and engages in it only to an 
optimal degree. Thus, when society’s gain from the actor’s conduct is greater 
than society’s loss, an optimal deterrence regime allows the actor to keep doing 
it, so long as he pays for any harm that he causes along the way. Despite the 
fact that it causes harm, we want him to keep doing it because society derives a 
net benefit from his activity.351 
As Kenneth Simons explains, in an optimal deterrence regime, the actor “is 
entitled to harm the victim so long as he pays for the harm (with the 
expectation that this entitlement will induce him to take optimal care),” 
whereas in a complete deterrence regime, the actor “is not entitled to harm the 
victim even if [he] is willing to pay for that harm.”352 
Optimal deterrence is not a punitive concept.353 Society does not “punish” 
someone for doing something that it affirmatively wants him to do.354 
Complete deterrence, however, is punitive. The goal of punishment, when it is 
imposed in the name of deterrence, is to prevent wrongful conduct—to deter it 
 
349.  Hylton, supra note 345, at 421. This concept is often referred to as “classical deterrence.” Id. 
at 421 n.1. 
350.  Id. at 421; see also Galligan, supra note 333, at 8-10 (noting the difference between these two 
forms of deterrence). 
351.  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 882. 
352.  Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 273 
(1996); see also Coffee, supra note 348, at 1876 & n.6 (explaining that this 
pricing/prohibition distinction can be expressed as the difference between optimal and total 
deterrence). 
353.  See Galligan, supra note 10, at 129. 
354.  See supra note 185 (noting that the concept of punishment implies the commission of an 
offense). 
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completely.355 Punishment seeks to ensure that persons will not engage in 
conduct, regardless of whether it produces more benefits to the wrongdoer (or 
to society) than harm to others. Punishment forces the wrongdoer to disgorge 
the full amount of his gain to prevent him from having a perverse incentive to 
keep doing something that the law considers to be inimical to the public 
interest, whether it is efficient or not.356 
A sanction that seeks complete deterrence is thus a punitive sanction, but 
that does not mean that it is a criminal sanction. That depends on the second 
question: whether it seeks primarily to serve the public interest of society or the 
private interest of the plaintiff. That is the inquiry that turns on the identity of 
the person or persons sought to be deterred. General deterrence (of the 
defendant and everyone else) is designed to serve the public interest in 
regulating behavior. Specific deterrence (of the defendant alone) is designed to 
serve the private interest in vindicating the plaintiff’s tort right. 
 
355.  See Hylton, supra note 345, at 423 (“The goal of punishment should be complete 
deterrence.”). 
356.  See Hylton, supra note 320, at 15. The distinction between optimal and complete deterrence 
is not without its conceptual problems. At one level, complete deterrence could be thought 
of as simply an application of optimal deterrence. After all, as Judge Easterbrook has noted, 
“[t]he optimal amount of fraud is zero.” Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 
1991). But of course, actually achieving a fraud level of zero might only be possible by 
imposing penalties so high that actors will over-invest in prevention, such that the costs 
invested in avoiding the fraud exceed the costs that the fraud would have imposed. Indeed, 
if the penalties for fraud were high enough, actors might avoid engaging altogether in any 
socially beneficial activities that carry with them even a slight risk of fraud liability. In that 
regard, perhaps no legal sanction—not even a punitive one—should be truly interested in 
complete, as opposed to optimal, deterrence. Indeed, in his seminal economic analysis of the 
criminal law, Gary Becker proposed an optimal deterrence—rather than complete 
deterrence—model of criminal punishment. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 198-99 (1968). That has not, however, been the 
traditional understanding of the criminal law. See Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties 
and the Economics of Criminal Law, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 175, 176 (2005) (noting that “criminal 
law adopts a policy of prohibition; it does not seek to constrain murder, theft, or rape to 
‘optimal’ levels”); id. at 176 n.4 (noting that Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham endorsed 
the notion that the criminal law should completely deter). One way to conceive of the 
distinction between optimal and complete deterrence is that complete deterrence is sought 
for practices that society would, in an ideal world, like to eliminate altogether (even if the 
realities of enforcement costs and marginal deterrence make that goal unachievable and 
perhaps even undesirable in practice), whereas optimal deterrence is sought for practices 
that society has no particular desire to eliminate altogether, so long as they remain 
economically efficient. Cf. Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate 
Misconduct, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 23, 41-43 (arguing that the 
pricing/prohibition distinction ultimately turns on society’s moral judgment of the 
behavior). 
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Of course, the plaintiff also has an interest in general deterrence in the 
sense that she does not want to get hurt by someone other than the defendant 
either. But any interest that she has in avoiding being harmed by others is one 
that she shares equally with everyone else in society. The interest that she has 
in avoiding repeated harm at the hands of the defendant, by contrast, is unique 
to the relationship between the two of them; it is a part of the private tort right 
that she seeks to vindicate in the civil action that she has filed against him. 
By the same token, society also has an interest in specific deterrence in the 
sense that it wants to ensure that the defendant is adequately deterred. Yet 
society’s interest in deterrence is necessarily broader. Why would the public 
have an interest in ensuring that one person does not act (or that he engages in 
an activity only to an optimal degree) but not care whether and to what extent 
anyone else engages in the same harmful activity? If a remedy is seeking 
specific deterrence, aimed at the defendant only, then it must be targeted 
primarily at the individual victim’s interests, not society’s. 
Thus, a sanction imposed in the name of deterrence is criminal in nature 
and necessitates criminal procedural safeguards only if it seeks complete and 
general deterrence. That is precisely the end sought by punitive damages as 
punishment for public wrongs: ensuring that neither the defendant nor anyone 
else357 will ever engage in this activity again,358 even if the conduct is 
economically efficient. The Supreme Court has explained that the prevailing 
modern understanding of punitive damages is premised on the notion that 
“‘[c]itizens and legislators may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate 
some loss in economic efficiency in order to deter what they consider morally 
offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct.’”359 
But a sanction that seeks complete and specific deterrence—like punitive 
damages employed as punishment for private wrongs—is not criminal.360 And 
a sanction that seeks optimal deterrence is not punishment, and thus is not 
criminal regardless of whether it seeks to regulate the behavior of the 
 
357.  See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (declaring that one of the 
purposes of punitive damages is “protecting the public by [deterring] the defendant and 
others from doing such wrong in the future” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
358.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194 n.4 (1991) (noting that 
“punitive damages . . . clearly are intended to prohibit, rather than price”); Galligan, supra 
note 333, at 9 n.7 (noting that, when courts speak of the deterrent function of punitive 
damages, they are referring to complete deterrence through punishment). 
359.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439-40 (2001) (quoting 
Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1450). 
360.  See supra Sections IV.C-D. 
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defendant only (specific deterrence)361 or the behavior of all other actors in 
society (general deterrence). 
The law and economics vision of punitive damages as an engine of cost 
internalization falls into the last category. It seeks to regulate broadly—to serve 
societal interests through general deterrence362—but it seeks only optimal 
deterrence, not complete deterrence.363 The law and economics movement has 
long understood that much behavior that causes great harm also brings even 
greater benefits, and thus must not be prohibited.364 The object of cost 
internalization is simply to ensure that individuals or parties engage in such 
behavior to an optimal degree, with optimal efforts to reduce the costs that it 
imposes. Law and economics scholars have accordingly insisted that their 
model of punitive damages is not really “punitive” at all,365 and that their 
sanction should be imposed regardless of the mental culpability of the 
 
361.  Dan Dobbs argues that punitive damages should be adapted to play the role of ensuring 
specific, optimal deterrence, and he correctly notes (without elaboration) that adapting 
them to this end would neutralize the argument that they should not be awarded without 
criminal procedural safeguards. See Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive” 
Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 854-56, 858-59 (1989). 
362.  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 877 (“By deterrence, we mean what is often called 
general deterrence, namely, the effect that the prospect of having to pay damages will have on 
the behavior of similarly situated parties in the future (not just on the behavior of the 
defendant at hand).”). 
363.  See Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring); 
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 954. Keith Hylton disagrees with other law and 
economics scholars when he argues that punitive damages generally should seek complete 
deterrence, not simply cost internalization. See Hylton, supra note 320, at 15. As such, 
Williams—as I seek to reconstruct it—bars the states from adopting his recommendation. 
Most of the other law and economics scholars who have analyzed punitive damages have 
concluded that sometimes, when the defendant’s behavior is sufficiently morally 
reprehensible, it might be appropriate to seek complete deterrence rather than optimal 
deterrence. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 909-10, 920 (arguing that, when 
an individual defendant’s benefit from the conduct was purely malicious, in the sense that it 
was derived from the fact of causing the harm, then the sanction should aim for complete 
deterrence). As Judge Calabresi acknowledges, however, that “function of punitive damages 
renders them analogous to criminal penalties that seek not to achieve a socially optimal level 
of activity, but to discourage or even eliminate a particular activity altogether,” at which 
point “it would be appropriate to reconsider the procedural protections that should attach 
before such an award can be made.” Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 246 n.8. 
364.  See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 1-3 (1985) (discussing 
automobiles). 
365.  See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 245 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Galligan, supra note 333, at 13; 
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 890-91; Sharkey, supra note 9, at 389-90. 
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defendant.366 If one were to run the cost internalization sanction through the 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez factors,367 it would clearly come out as 
noncriminal: it is not labeled as punishment; it is not regarded as punishment 
by those who advocate it; it does not come into play only on a finding of 
scienter; it does not promote the traditional goals of punishment—retribution 
and complete deterrence; it applies to conduct that is not necessarily criminal; 
and it is carefully targeted to serve an alternative, nonpunitive purpose.368 It is 
thus not a criminal sanction, and the Williams decision should not be read to 
preclude it.369 Justice O’Connor once wrote, in discussing punitive damages, 
that “‘[j]ust as the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Herbert Spencer’s 
Social Statics,’ it does not require us to adopt the views of the Law and 
Economics school either.”370 But at the same time, it does not prohibit us from 
 
366.  See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 246 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Galligan, supra note 333, at 62-63; 
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 874. 
367.  See supra text accompanying note 266. 
368.  Cf. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980) (noting that a sanction can be 
nonpenal—noncriminal—if it has a “correlation to any damages sustained by society”). 
369.  Cf. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 n.13 (2001) 
(noting that if a state were to adopt a damages remedy that seeks optimal economic 
efficiency, a different constitutional analysis would apply); Calabresi, supra note 23, at 339 
(noting that, when punitive damages seek only cost internalization, “as no semi criminal law 
objectives are at play, there is no reason to impose procedural safeguards”); Coffee, supra 
note 348, at 1883 (arguing that a penalty that goes beyond cost internalization is 
“‘punishment’ (in the constitutional sense),” whereas a “penalty equal to the social cost of 
the behavior can be described as nonpunitive,” and thus “the full constitutional safeguards 
applicable to criminal prosecutions need not apply”); Fellmeth, supra note 198, at 54-55, 59 
(arguing that a “deterrent” sanction that necessitates criminal procedural protections is one 
that leads to complete deterrence, rather than one that allows the defendant to pay for the 
harm that it causes while continuing to engage in harmful behavior); Galligan, supra note 
10, at 149-150 (noting that, even if the Supreme Court in Campbell adopted the theory that 
punitive damages may not punish public wrongs, it did not necessarily signal the end of 
punitive damages as an engine of optimal deterrence, since they would be nonpunitive); 
Sharkey, supra note 9, at 401 (“By reconceptualizing these underdeterrence damages as 
societal compensation, as opposed to quasi-fines or penalties, the societal damages approach 
would seem to survive the retributive-punishment-focused due process constraints of State 
Farm . . . .”). For this reason, I disagree with Zipursky’s conclusion that cost internalization 
“really fall[s] on the criminal side of the divide,” Zipursky, supra note 7, at 141, and with 
Sebok’s conclusion that cost internalization is a form of “punishment” or “penalty” that is 
ultimately subject to the same due process constraints that apply to traditional punitive 
damages, Sebok, supra note 341, at 547-49, 569. 
370.  TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 491-92 (1993) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
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adopting the views of the law and economics school.371 Williams does not stand 
in the way of implementing an extracompensatory remedy that seeks optimal 
deterrence.372 
Even so, Judge Calabresi, a champion of cost internalization, is unsatisfied. 
In a thought-provoking recent essay, he argues that punitive damages can 
serve, and often have served, a variety of “very different functions,” and he 
explains that “each function, if it were the sole object of such 
extracompensatory damages, would have rules and limits that make no sense if 
one examines punitive damages through the prism of a different function.”373 It 
may be perfectly sensible for an academic to adopt a single, unified model of 
punitive damages, he says, but for a court to do so is “foolishness”374: 
 
What may well be right from a unidimensional and reductionist view 
of a torts problem, what is the basis of a very helpful and deep analysis 
by a scholar like Colby, what may even be correctly seen—as Colby 
asserts—as the historical origin of punitive damages in America, 
 
371.  At least not for the reasons that underlie Williams. I take no position here on whether cost-
internalization damages raise other constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 7, 
at 141-42, 148 (suggesting that even nonpunitive, noncriminal regulation through private 
tort actions can raise constitutional problems). Nor do I opine on whether Catherine 
Sharkey’s intriguing proposal to create “societal compensatory damages”—damages that 
seek to ensure both cost internalization and the compensation of other victims (and society 
more generally), see Sharkey, supra note 9; cf. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 247 (Calabresi, J., 
concurring) (making a similar proposal)—might be unconstitutional for other reasons, 
despite their noncriminal nature. See, e.g., Michael B. Kelly, Do Punitive Damages Compensate 
Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1429, 1434 (2004) (outlining several potential due process 
objections to awarding societal compensatory damages based on injuries to absent parties); 
cf. Colby, supra note 9, at 592-602 (noting the potential for unfairness that such a remedy 
would need to avoid). 
372.  One might speculate that, as a practical matter, it would be impossible for reviewing courts 
to ascertain whether extracompensatory damages were awarded in the name of optimal 
deterrence, rather than complete deterrence (and/or public retribution). A state could, 
however, easily implement the law and economics sanction in a way that would leave no 
doubt on the question. A state seeking to do so could (and should) drop the “punitive” label 
altogether, abandon the scienter requirement, preclude jury argument based on notions of 
retribution or complete deterrence, and instruct the jury pursuant to a law-and-economics-
inspired multiplier formula. Indeed, the jury instructions could explicitly inform the jurors 
that their task is not to punish, or to stamp out the activity, but simply to ensure that the 
defendant absorbs all of (but nothing more than) the cost of the harm that it causes. 
373.  Calabresi, supra note 23, at 336. 
374.  Id. at 346; see also David F. Partlett, Punitive Damages: Legal Hot Zones, 56 LA. L. REV. 781, 
792 (1996) (opining, before Campbell and Williams, that “courts have shown a good deal of 
wisdom to resist academic categorizations urging singular normative bases for punitive 
damages”). 
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becomes dangerously wrong when applied across the board as a 
matter of constitutional necessity by a torts-ignorant Court to a 
multidimensional and complex set of problems!375 
 
While the rule that punitive damages may not redress harm to nonparties 
makes sense when punitive damages are understood as a form of punishment, 
it becomes “dangerous, and almost silly, if one accepts the possibility that the 
common law of any given state may have had some or all of the other rationales 
‘in mind’ when it developed its own rules and limits on punitive damages.”376 
Judge Calabresi’s point is well taken, but it can, I think, be answered. As 
the foregoing discussion of the cost-internalization sanction makes clear, the 
fact that the Court has placed appropriate limits on genuinely punitive damages 
does not mean that the states may not choose to adopt (or continue in effect) 
nominally “punitive” damages that are in fact designed to serve other, 
nonpunitive functions. In other words, contrary to the objections of critics, 
Williams does not constitutionalize the view of punitive damages as 
punishment for private wrongs.377 Rather, it simply takes off the table one of 
the many possible uses for punitive damages—punishment for public wrongs. 
The states are free to adopt (or continue in effect) other forms of 
extracompensatory damages that serve one or more alternative goals; they 
simply need to make clear that these damages are not a form of impermissible 
punishment and to make sure that they are never used as one. 
Judge Calabresi recognizes this, but he believes that there are substantial 
costs to forcing the states to do so: “[I]n the end a society may . . . be better 
served by the retention of multipurposed, somewhat inconsistent concepts.”378 
Punitive damages have traditionally served many purposes at once, have 
unconsciously promoted additional values as well, and have even served goals 
 
375.  Calabresi, supra note 23, at 346. Judge Calabresi was writing before Williams but was of the 
opinion that the Campbell Court had already adopted my position. See id. 
376.  Id. 
377.  But see Allen, supra note 289, at 364-65 (“[B]y framing the issue as one of federal 
constitutional law, the Court has made it practically impossible for any entity other than 
itself—state or federal—to change this stunted conception of punitive damages.”); Rustad, 
supra note 239, at 464 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court is forcing the states into a 
common mold based upon an individualistic retributory jurisprudence bypassing the 
multiple functions of punitive damages that have evolved over two centuries of Anglo-
American jurisprudence.”). 
378.  Calabresi, supra note 23, at 347. 
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that we secretly desire but do not want to admit to openly.379 To force the 
states to spell out the exact purpose and function of punitive damages is to 
force them to give up these benefits. Judge Calabresi believes that it is 
wrongheaded and unduly disrespectful of state sovereignty for the Supreme 
Court to require them to do so.380 
In the abstract, I am agnostic on the relative advantages of, on the one 
hand, mandating the clarification of muddled doctrines and, on the other 
hand, allowing the blurring of doctrinal rationales in order to serve varied and 
perhaps even conflicting interests—although I am inclined to defer to Judge 
Calabresi’s wisdom and experience here.381 And I wholeheartedly agree with 
Judge Calabresi that this choice should ordinarily be one for the states to make; 
the Supreme Court should generally butt out of the common law. But in this 
particular instance, I believe that the Constitution forces the Court’s hand. By 
way of analogy, if a state imposed a poll tax that had come to serve the 
purposes of both raising money and precluding the poor from voting, that tax 
would be unconstitutional.382 The fact that, in part, it served a legitimate 
interest—revenue raising—would not save it. The state would remain free to 
raise revenue in a different way, through a different tax that did not violate the 
Constitution. But it would be incumbent upon the courts to force the state to 
disentangle the constitutional from the unconstitutional. 
So, too, here. In most states, there is no doubt that punitive damages are 
used primarily as punishment. That is how the plaintiff’s lawyer explains them 
to the jury.383 That is how the trial court instructs the jury.384 And that is what 
 
379.  See id. On this last point, Judge Calabresi has in mind what he calls the “tragic choices” 
function of punitive damages: the self-contradictory fact that we generally want 
manufacturers to make efficient cost-benefit analyses in determining how much to invest in 
product safety, but at the same time we do not want to allow them to defend against liability 
on efficiency grounds when their products tragically cause injury or death. See id. at 340-43. 
380.  See id. at 348. 
381.  For an argument contrary to Judge Calabresi’s, see Geistfeld, supra note 23, at 1115-16, which 
argues that when the Court imposes constitutional limits that are premised on a particular 
conception of the nature of tort liability, the states can get around those requirements by 
explicitly grounding their tort law in a different conception, and thus the Court’s decisions 
“can serve the valuable role of forcing state courts and legislatures to identify more clearly 
the substantive objectives of tort liability.” 
382.  See generally Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (declaring a poll tax 
unconstitutional). 
383.  See Colby, supra note 9, at 584 & n.3. 
384.  See id. at 610. 
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tends to drive the jury’s verdict.385 They are, after all, called punitive damages. 
The constitutional implications of that reality cannot be avoided by the fact 
that they might on other occasions, or even simultaneously, serve other goals—
goals that the states are free to continue to pursue once they disentangle them 
from punishment. The states are free to maintain extracompensatory remedies, 
even muddled ones that simultaneously serve any number of state interests, so 
long as one of those interests is not the punishment of public wrongs. Williams 
was thus correctly decided, notwithstanding its interference with the 
traditional role of the states in shaping the law of torts. Tort law—like all law—
is constrained by the Constitution.386 
conclusion 
Although its reasoning was incomplete and at times misguided, the 
Supreme Court ultimately got it right when it held in Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams that the Constitution prohibits the use of punitive damages to punish 
a defendant for harm caused to persons not before the court. To punish the 
defendant for the wrong done to the plaintiff is to vindicate the plaintiff’s 
private interest in revenge—a legitimate goal of the civil law. To punish the 
defendant for the total harm visited upon all of society, by contrast, is to 
vindicate the public’s interests in retribution and complete deterrence. Those 
interests, however, are the province of the criminal law, and the Constitution 
does not allow the state to outsource their vindication to private parties in an 
end run about the procedural safeguards guaranteed to criminal defendants by 
the Bill of Rights. This Article argues that that is the true justification for the 
Court’s holding in Williams, and it suggests that one consequence of that fact is 
that Williams does not stand in the way of implementing a law-and-
economics-inspired cost-internalization sanction that is not a form of 
punishment and thus does not implicate the concerns of the criminal law. 
 
 
385.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 70, 73, 134 (2002) 
(concluding based on empirical research that retribution drives juries’ punitive damages 
awards); Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic 
Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 72-73 (1998) 
(concluding, based on empirical research, that the size of a punitive damages award 
generally depends on the jury’s retributive intent). For an example of the extent to which 
juries view punitive damages as a form of genuine punishment, see Arnett v. Fuston, 378 
S.W.2d 425, 430 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), in which the jury concluded, “We declare L. D. 
Fuston guilty of the charge and recommend a judgment of $30,000.00 against him and 
punitive damages from one to five years in prison.” 
386.  See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
